

## KALAM VALLEY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ITS ANNEXATION AND INTEGRATION WITH SWAT STATE (1915-1969)

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### ABSTRACT

*Kalam valley is widely known for its unmatched beauty. Kalam at present is part of district Swat. It shares boundaries with District Dir and Chitral. The area has an absorbing history and it remained a sort of buffer area amongst the extinct Princely States of Dir, Chitral and Swat till 1954, when ultimately Supplementary Instrument of Accession was signed by the last Wali of Swat, Miangul Jahanzeb with the Government of Pakistan. Its location led to tense relations between the rulers of the three states and at times led to an alarming situation that was felt in the echelons of British Government in India. The British till 1947 maintained status quo in the area. However, after the creation of Pakistan, the Ruler of Swat State took both aggressive and diplomatic steps to include it in Swat State. In this paper, the pre and post partition developments in Kalam valley and its relation with Swat State will be discussed.*

### Key words

Swat State, Kalam, Chitral State, Dir State, Wali of Swat, Swat Kohistan

### Historical Background of Kalam Valley in the pre Swat State era

Kalam is a true gem of nature and words fall short in describing its beauty. Kalam is mainly known as a tourist destination and is a popular hill station surrounded by tall peaks. The tourists visit the place in large number, stay there for a brief phase, enjoy its natural beauty and then return to their abodes. Ironically, during all this sight-seeing, they pay little attention to the historic and distinctive nature of Kalam and its cultural diversity. It is worth mentioning Ushu and Utror are also considered as parts of Kalam. The areas of Kalam, Utror and Ushu are also termed as Gawri tract. Historically names like Kohistan, Swat Kohistan and Kohistan of Swat are used for the area.

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According to David Dichter, the stretching from the crest of the Shandur range in a south-easterly direction across the Indus River to the head of the Kaghan valley in northern Hazara is a continuous mountain mass which is collectively known as Kohistan. The word Kohistan is applied to any person who comes from a remote mountainous area of the province and it is the name of a particular tongue in the Dardic language group. For easiness of description, it can be broken into two divisions, Dir-Swat Kohistan and Indus Kohistan (Dichter 1967: 30). A senior British army official, Edmund George Barrow, wrote about Kalam in 1885:

A village in the upper part of the Swat Kohistan at the confluence of the Ushu and Gabriel [Gabral] streams. From the south it is reached by a bridge across the Gabriel [Gabral], or Utrot [Utror] Nadi, which is passable for laden horses. The valley is here fairly open. Kalam is a large village, containing about 1,000 houses and a masjid. There are about twenty water-mills here, and the inhabitants are generally wealthy, being possessed of large herds, and exporting ghi in quantities to Peshawar. The pines and deodars about here are magnificent. Oak, apricot, walnut, apple, and vine also grow hereabouts. Indian corn, barley, and wheat are plentiful. The inhabitants belong to the Bashkar branch of the Dard race, and pay tribute to Yasan (Barrow 1885: 122).

About the ethnic groups in the area, Fredrik Barth stated:

Indus and Swat Kohistan are inhabited by several distinct ethnic groups: the Kohistan proper of Indus Kohistan, subdivided into two dialect groups who disclaim any genetic relationship to each other; the Gawri in the north and the Torwali in the south of Swat Kohistan, these three all being what has been called Dardic (Linguistic Survey of India), i.e. old Indo-Aryan speaking peoples; nomadic summer visitors, some in permanent settlements, speakers of Pashto or Gujri (a lowland Indian dialect), and mainly found in Swat Kohistan (Barth 1956: 12-13).

The predecessors of Kohistani speaking people were most likely the same as the Gawri, who inhabited the lower and more fertile parts of Swat and Dir from the days of Alexander the Great. However, in 11th century A.D, the area was conquered by the forces of Mahmud of Ghazna. Resultantly, the then native population was forced to take flight to the remote and inaccessible upper mountains (Hakimzai 2015: 14).

Traditions endorse the view that from these groups of Gawri settlers crossed the mountain passes into Utror, Kalam and Ushu valleys which are now parts of District Swat, while the rest remained in the upper Panjkora valley of district Dir (Sagar 2018). Charles Lindholm argues:

It is probable that the inhabitants of the valley at this time were those now called Kohistani (mountain men), who at present live in the rocky defiles above Madyan, having been driven from the valley by Mahmud of Ghazni in 1004. Mahmud, though he reputedly converted the Swatis to Islam at sword point, had no interest in establishing a state or in ruling the people he defeated (Lindholm 1982: 33).

When the Yousufzai tribe of Pashtuns occupied the lower parts of Swat and Dir districts and thus forced the previously living residents to flee across the Indus and also to the upper parts of Swat and Panjkora valley. The Yusufzai Afghans however, did not proceed to Swat Kohistan and thus the area was left undisturbed. Under the dominance of these new immigrants, Kohistanis converted to Islam, possibly in the 16th century (Sagar 2021). However, some historians argue that this conversion of religion took place much later. Fredrik Barth wrote:

In spite of these recurrent invasions, there are still populations in the uppermost section of the valley who are non-Pashtun, and entirely alien in language and culture to the occupants of the rest of the territory. Though they speak two distinct languages, they are generally lumped with other mountain people under the name Kohistani. They have a tradition that they formerly occupied the more fertile areas to the south, and have been identified with at least a section of the old Buddhist population. The Kohistani languages belong to the Dardic language family and are thus related to those of Gilgit and Kashmir. Kohistani settlements are found only where the valley bottom lies above 5000 ft.; this is the altitude above which it is impossible to raise two cereal crops a year. It seems reasonable to relate the upward limits of Pathan expansion to this ecological limiting factor (Barth 1970: 7-8).

John Biddulph opined in 1880 that both these communities, i.e., Afghans and Kohistanis, greatly dislike each other and that their hostility seldom rises to active opposition. He asserted that the Afghans penetrated into Kohistan area for the purposes of trade, disregarded the black looks and cold welcome so long as they could discern a profit to be made (Biddulph 1971: 69-70).

The area was closed for the outside world and for Englishmen in particular, inspite the fact that they ruled the Subcontinent till 1947. The colonial Britishers historically had great curiosity about the area. Their accounts of this picturesque area till their actual arrival in Malakand area in 1895 were mainly based on the references and verbal information provided to them by informants and sources who visited the place. Major Henry George Raverty, a linguists and officer in British Army, in his quest to know about Swat and its various features sent a *mullah* to this cutoff land. The Qandahari *mullah* provided very important historical details to the colonial Britishers about Swat and Kalam as well. Major Raverty wrote about the secluded Kalam valley in 1862:

Having now reached the boundary or extremity of Upper Suwat [Swat], beyond which I could not then penetrate...I will here give you the information I gained respecting the country beyond, up to the source of the Suwat [Swat] river, which I obtained from an intelligent Afghan who passed several years there... (Raverty 1862: 252).

Major Raverty further added:

After leaving Pi'a [Piya], the boundary of Upper Suwat [Swat], the first village is that of Chur-rra'i (now Madyan), beyond which the Pushto or Afghan language ceases to be spoken, and the Kohistani language is used. The first village is Biran-yal (now Bahrain) inhabited by Tor-wals [Towrals], which is situated on the left or western bank of the Kohistan river as the river of Suwat [Swat] is also termed. The distance between this village of Biran-yal [Bahrain] and the village of Chur-rra'I (Madyan) is about eight miles, from the first of which the Kohistan may be said to commence. The people here too understand Pushto... The whole of this space is occupied by two tribes; first the Tor-wals [Torwals], sometimes also called Rud-baris; and above them again, the Garwi tribe. The amount of the former is about 9,000 adult males, and the Garwis about 3,000. Hence it will be seen, that this district is densely populated (Raverty 1862: 252).

Major Raverty also shed light on the then isolated Kalam valley and the different routes that led to it, stating that, “at the extreme head of the valley (Swat), near the mountain of Sardzaey there is a Pass leading into Kashkar; another road leads through the darah of U'shu, on the eastern side, into Gilgitt [Gilgit]; and another leading into Panjkorah through the Cha-yal darah [Chail Darah]” (Raverty 1862: 258).

H.W Bellow mentioned the name Shukalam for Kalam valley. He wrote that, “the eastern extremity of Swat beyond Churrai [Madyan] is occupied by the Shukalam district. It is a narrow, long and winding defile connecting Swat with the Yasan country by a three days journey over the most difficult hills. It is occupied by Kohistanis who are not Afghans, and is celebrated for its ponies, which are here bred in great numbers, and sold mostly in the Kashkar country” (Bellow 1864: 49-50).

The beauty of Kalam and indeed the entire Swat Kohistan is proverbial. Its beauty made Major Raverty remark, that, “the very residence in which would be sufficient to make a man happy...each has its own clear stream running through it towards the main river, the banks of each of which, on either side, are shaded with fine trees, many of which bear the finest fruits, and beneath which, every here and there, there are fragments of rock lying about where one may sit down and rest himself, while the hills on either side are clothed up to their very summits, with forests of pine, the tops of which yield a most fragrant smell. Dust is never seen” (Raverty 1888: 206).

The political scenario changed in Swat when the British took over Punjab from the Sikhs and started ruling the Indian Subcontinent. However, Swat Kohistan was not perturbed by the various changes and the tug of war that took place in the Swat amongst the various contenders for assuming ascendancy. When Sayyid Akbar Shah of Sithana (1849-1857) took the reins of Swat in 1849 on the invitation of Akhund of Swat, famously known as Saidu Baba, the change had no political impact on the area under consideration. Similarly, the Swat Kohistanis remained peaceful and aloof during the Ambela campaign (Buner) of the British in 1863. The spiritual supremacy and worldly influence of Akhund of Swat and the rise of his descendants in lower Swat had no bearing on Swat Kohistan. The area also remained politically undisturbed during the aggressive engagements of Nawab of Dir to take control over parts of Swat on the right bank of Swat River. During the punitive expedition of the British after Malakand Uprising of 1897, the English forces went as far as Gulibagh area of Swat and did not penetrate into Swat Kohistan tract. Major E.A.P Hobday wrote in 1898, that, “the Spur above Gal-i-Bagh [Gulibagh] was the farthest point reached by the cavalry on the 21st (August 1897), and the most distant point in the Swat Valley visited during the expedition...we got a view of the snows of Kohistan, which was very fine” (Hobday 1898: 53).



### **Kalam Valley in Swat State era (1915-1969):**

Similarly, Sayyid Abdul Jabbar Shah (1915-1917) had no sway in Swat Kohistan during his short reign from 1915 to 1917. When Miangul Abdul Wadud (1917-1949) popularly known as Badshah Sahib came into power in 1917 as ruler of Swat State, the centuries old status quo and scenario started to change. His aggressive designs and policy of expansion led to confrontation with neighboring areas of Swat State. Historically, Swat Kohistan enjoyed political freedom for many centuries due to its geographic location and hard access. In 1926, Swat State was formally recognized by the British as a princely State (Hay 1934: 241).

According to the agreement of recognition in 1926, the British Indian Government stipulated that Miangul Abdul Wadud will not interfere secretly and openly by force of arms or otherwise with the people of Kohistan and tracts of Ushu, Kalam and Utror (Area Study Centre, UoP, 67). Prior to this recognition and also afterwards, Badshah Sahib extended his State boundaries in different directions by incorporating Buner, Shangla and parts of Indus Kohistan into the State. Buner was included in the State in 1923, Shangla was conquered in 1924 and Indus Kohistan was subdued in 1939 (Rome 2008: 117-120).

During all these conquests by Miangul Abdul Wadud, Kalam remained independent not only from the suzerainty of Swat but also from the other two Princely States, i.e., Chitral and Dir. All these three Princely States were located in close proximity to Kalam (Barth 1995: 102). The rulers of these States put their claims from time to time over Kalam but could not materialize their assertions. The Nawab of Dir claimed that as the people of Kalam spoke the same language and had close ties with Dir Kohistan, so his claim over Swat Kohistan is based on factual grounds (Barth 1995: 102).

Fateh-Ul-Mulk Ali Nasir writes about Nawab's claim on Kalam:

His (Nawab) primary claim to Kalam was the fact that the same ethnic group that dominated the upper most part of the Dir Valley, known as Dir Kohistan and centered on the enchanting vale of Kumrat, was also present in Kalam, i.e, both Kumrat and Kalam were populated by the Gawri people. Other than this the Nawab had no other claim, as even in the heyday of his ancestors, when they ruled Western Swat, Kalam remained outside the control of Dir. Despite his tenuous claims the Nawab prepared his forces to invade Kalam via Kumrat (Nasir 2020).

The Mehtar of Chitral also claimed it on the ground that whenever a Ruler of Chitral was exiled, he used to take refuge in Kalam. Besides, a number of people spoke Khowari, which is a language in Chitral (Barth 1995:102). According to Fateh-ul-Mulk Ali Nasar, Chitral's claim on Kalam was due to the fact that:

Chitral was the oldest political entity among the three states contending for Kalam and had the strongest social and legal claim to the tract. For at least two centuries the people of Kalam had been paying tribute to the Mehtar of Chitral. By the time of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk this had been formalized and he appointed a Hakim (administrator/revenue collector) for the Kalam region who was based at the fort of Matiltan. The Kalamis paid their tribute in the form of their small sized indigenous mountain ponies, known in Khowar as Bashqarikan. Alongside horses imported from Badakhshan these Kalami ponies were used in the national sport of Chitral, polo. Furthermore, there was a community of Chitrali settlers in the Ushu Valley of Kalam who still speak Khowar to this day. It is for this reason that the Gawris went to Chitral to set their grievances to the Mehtar. The ruler of Chitral at the time was His Highness Mehtar Nasir-ul-Mulk. He was the only ruler among the Frontier States to enjoy the status of a Gun Salute ruler and the accompanying title of His Highness, this led to a bit of jealousy towards Chitral as Dir and Swat both had larger populations and were agriculturally more productive and thus wealthier... Nasir-ul-Mulk immediately wrote to the Political Agent stressing Chitral's ancient claim to Kalam and at the same time sent a contingent of the Chitral State Forces to Laspur to prepare for an invasion of Kalam via the Kachakani Pass (Nasir 2020).

Major Henry Raverty in his important work titled, 'Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan', also argued that the people of Kohistan were under the sway of Badshah of Drush, Mir Shah Raza. The British author, John Biddulph remarked in 1880, that Bushkar was the name given to the community which inhabited the upper part of the Panjkora Valley, whence they were overflowed into the upper part of the Swat Valley, and they occupied the three large villages of Utror, Ushu and Kalam. He added that, they live on good terms with their Torwal neighbors, and number altogether from 12,000 to 15,000 souls. The three villages in the Swat Valley pay tribute to Yassin, and the three northernmost villages in the Panjkora Valley pay a double tribute to Yassin and Chitral. He remarked that Birkot, Biar, and Rashkot pay a double tribute

to Chitral and Dir, and the five Bushkar villages below Rashkot pay tribute solely to Dir (Biddulph 1971: 70).

According to Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb, popularly known as Wali Sahib (reign 1949-1969), the claim of Swat State on Kalam was based on the ground that geographically; it was a part of the Swat valley. The people of Kalam could not take out their timber except through Swat. Besides, they could not transport anything into Kalam, without going through Swat (Barth 1995: 102).

Fateh-Ul-Mulk Ali Nasar sheds light on the relation of Kalam with Swat State as well. He argues:

He (Cobb, Political Agent, Dir, Swat and Chitral) had seen that Miangul Abdul Wadud was a man who had the requisite experience needed to build a state and would have little difficulty in merging Kalam with Swat. The Wali may not have been the scholar statesman that the Mehtar was but he was an administrator par excellence. Miangul Abdul Wadud had visions of making Swat a modern, developed state and he laid the groundwork for his son and successor Miangul Jahanzeb to do so. Cobb also realized a very important point. Kalam was geographically part of the Swat Valley and despite the Chitrali claims the only all-weather route in and out of Kalam was along the Swat River down to Bahrain and then Mingora. If Kalam was to be developed and its resources exploited, only Swat would be in a position to do so effectively...! Cobb personally visited the Wali and told him not to interfere in Kalam and although he understood that his claim to the tract was valid, the Government of India could not risk a war in such a sensitive region between states which were all protectorates of the British Crown. Kalam was then declared an independent Tribal Area and Dir, Swat and Chitral were all made to give assurances in writing that they would respect the autonomy of the Kalam Tribal Agency (Nasir 2020).

Miangul Abdul Wadud (Badshah Sahib) wrote about the annexation of Bahrain, which was a very important strategic place on the way to Kalam:

So far Swat Kohistan was neither included in my domain nor did I think of subjugating it. A delegation of prominent Kohistanis waited on me with the request that their region should be merged in the State. The times were such that even for voluntary merger a show of might was necessary, and being absorbed in preparations for Buner



undertaking, I expressed inability to comply with their wish, as my hands were already too full. But they would not take no for an answer and refused to leave without the lashkar. Desiring to gain their hearts, I sent my Commander-in-Chief with a detachment, but privately coached him to come away on some pretext. At Bahrain they decided that having travelled so far nothing could be easier to occupy it. Without obtaining my permission, they beset the town but were repulsed. They now realized their mistake and called for reinforcements, the message took long to reach me and, consequently, the relief force was delayed by many days. In the meantime, the Kohistanis wreaked their vengeance on the Swati soldiers who had retired to a hill nearby, so much so that all of them with their commander were about to be killed when the rescue luckily arrived and the enemy lashkar was put to flight. Thus we occupied Bahrain, a very strategic town of Kohistan, and fortified it well as usual. Had the reinforcement not reached in time, none of my men could have escaped death, in which case the situation would have been the reverse. The Commander-in-Chief had acted arbitrarily, assailed a stronghold of the enemy without my prior assent, and his error of judgment had endangered the lives of hundreds. Yet I did not take him to task for that, only reprimanded him to be more careful in future (Hussain 1962: 78-79).

Bahrain in the past had proved a very difficult defile and served for a long time to have constituted a separate tribal territory and independent from the Yusufzai clans (Grierson 1929: 6). According to Sir Aurel Stein, the annexation of Bahrain dates back to the year 1922, when the Miangul Abdul Wadud, the ruler of Swat extended his sway over the territory, using the opportunity offered by the absence of the fighting force of Torwals whom a feud with their northern neighbours had drawn off at the time to Kalam. The closer relations now established with the Pashtun population of Swat valley below Madyan resulted in increasing trade intercourse under the Miangul's beneficent rule (Grierson, 1929, 6). Major W.R Hay stated that prior to annexation of this tract, the Swat Kohistanis had helped some of the *Khans* of Swat in their efforts to restrict the influence of Miangul Abdul Wadud. The ruler of Swat, thus after pacifying the *Khans* turned his attention to Swat Kohistan. The State forces had thus no difficulty in occupying the whole of their country as far as Peshmal (Hay, 1934, 240). After the annexation of Bahrain in 1922, Swat State introduced its own administration and appointed officers who were answerable to the Wali of Swat (Barth 1956: 73).

Major W.R Hay, the then Political Agent, Dir, Swat and Chitral wrote in 1934, that Bahrain tehsil included the whole of the Torwal portion of Swat Kohistan in so far as it lied within Swat State. He added that it ran from Shahgram (exclusive) in the south to the boundaries of Kalam and Hariani to the north and that it was entirely inhabited by Torwalis. The leading men then in Bahrain were Amir Malak, Yusuf Jan Malak and Kator Khan Malak (Hay, 1934, 28-29).

In September 1912, the Nawab of Dir's *lashkar* arrived at Pararai, Swat and an ultimatum was sent to the inhabitants who fled to the left bank of the river. The Nawab's forces occupied the place without opposition and looted it. The Political Agent had previously intimated to the Nawab through his Native Assistant that his intended aggression was not approved to him. Interestingly, the Political Agent anticipated that Swat Kohistan was the Nawab's next objective (NWFP Provincial Diary, 30th September 1912, Peshawar). Subsequently, the Kohistanis also had a big meeting at Baranial to discuss the question of the Nawab's intended aggression on their country. Sartor Faqir, a leading figure at that point of time in the valley, was invited to attend the *Jarga* but he did not participate in it. He, however, sent a word to the Hindustani fanatics that they should help the Kohistanis in this regard (NWFP Provincial Diary, 30th November 1912, Peshawar). In the early days of March 1915, when the Swatis made a common cause against the Nawab of Dir to through away his yoke, some 200 Kohistanis came to the help of the Swatis (NWFP Provincial Diary, 13th March 1915, Peshawar).

Interestingly in the third week of June 1918, Miangul Abdul Wadud sent men to collect *ushr* (a religious tithe drawn from local production) from Tirat area which was then a colony of the Jinki Khel tribe and had never before paid *ushr* to anyone in the past. It was also reported that two men calling themselves Turks went to Swat Kohistan and met Sandakai Mulla, who entertained them and sent them on to Indus Kohistan. Some men from the Haji of Turangzai also met him and urged for fresh efforts for *jihad* against the British Indian Government (NWFP Provincial Diary, 21st June 1918, Peshawar).

According to a British Confidential Weekly Diary, an alarming situation surfaced in April 1922, when the elder son of Mehtar of Chitral, Shahzada Nasir-ul-Mulk, after leaving the Islamia College for vacation, proceeded to Saidu on the invitation of Miangul Abdul Wadud (ruler of Swat State). After staying for some days, he wished to proceed to Swat Kohistan through the Swat Valley's route (NWFP Weekly Diary, 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1922, Peshawar). The Confidential Diary states that the main objective of Mehtar's son by visiting Kalam was to obtain, 'a plebiscite in the Mehtar's favour regarding Swat Kohistan'. After Badshah Sahib's

disapproval by not allowing him to proceed to Kalam, the Shahzada, Nasir ul Mulk wrote to Political Agent for assistance. The Confidential Diary adds that, “If his Highness the Mehtar were to send Chitrali troops into the country via Laspur, the probability is that they would be attacked not only by the Nawab of Dir, but also by the Mian Gul (Badshah Sahib), and an interesting battle of the ‘all against all’ description would start in the area.” (Confidential Weekly Diary, 23rd April 1922, Peshawar). The next sentence of the Confidential Diary manifests the intensity of the situation and also the desire of the rulers of the three Princely States to take control of Kalam. The Report mentions that incase a warlike situation arose amongst the rulers of three princely states on Kalam, it, “would tinge with red the headwater of the Swat River.” (Confidential Weekly Diary, 23rd April 1922, Peshawar).

Interestingly, the son of Pakhtunwali Khan of Tangir in the Gilgit Agency and his cousin, along with twenty-five men, who were driven out of Tangir by the people of that country were also at Saidu Sharif as guests of the Wali of Swat. They also used all their influence over Badshah Sahib against permitting Nasir Ul Mulk of Chitral to visit Kalam. Consequently, Badshah Sahib prevented Mehtar’s son from proceeding beyond Saidu Sharif, the capital of Swat State. At the same time, he did not allow the other Chitralis with the Shahzada to go there via the Swat route (Confidential Weekly Diary ending on 23rd April 1922, Peshawar).

The Political Agent further indicated that the Mehtar of Chitral had written to the Nawab of Dir informing him that he has sent his son to Saidu Sharif in order to press his claims to Swat Kohistan. After receiving the letter, the Nawab too was greatly enraged at this step of the Mehtar. The Nawab in response, sent his wife, the sister of the Mehtar, to Timor Killa near Serai, to convey his protests to the Mehtar of Chitral (Confidential Weekly Diary ending on 7 April 1923, Peshawar). The Political Agent at Malakand anticipated that the Mehtar of Chitral was not expected to take any unconstitutional action in connection of taking control over Kalam. The Confidential Diary further adds:

As regards the Swat-Kohistan position, His Highness the Mehtar, in response to several telegrams from the Hon’ble the Chief Commissioner, has now announced his intention of leaving his claims to this country (and) to be decided by Government. He has recalled his son, Shahzada Nasir-ul-Mulk, from Saidu (capital of Swat State) and has requested the Political Agent to arrange for the recall from Kohistan via the Swat Valley of certain Chitralis who had gone in there by northern routes. The Mian Gul, for his part, also repeated his promises that he will not aggress in that region unless the action of the

Mehtar compels him to do so (Confidential Weekly Diary ending on 19 May 1923, Peshawar).

It is worth mentioning that in 1922, the area of Swat Kohistan till Peshmal was incorporated in Swat State without any substantial opposition. Badshah Sahib's *lashkar* returned to Saidu Sharif after completing a post at Balakot in Swat Kohistan in second week of January 1923. Subsequently, a *jarga* consisting of about 150 men of the Kohistani faction that favoured the ruler of Swat State also come to the capital of the State. He wanted to take the *jarga* to the Political Agent at Malakand in January 1923 to ensure the integration of Kalam into Swat State as well (Confidential Weekly Diary ending on 13<sup>th</sup> January 1923, Peshawar). However, in 1923, the colonial Government warned the rulers of princely states of Chitral, Dir and Swat not to interfere in Kalam (A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, 1983, 426). Thus Kalam was left as a no man's land amongst the three princely States (Hay, 1934, 240). Interestingly, the then Heir Apparent of Dir State, Shah Jahan Khan wrote on 12th April 1923 to the Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral that though the ruler of Swat State has broken his promise with British Political authorities twice, once by attacking Swat Kohistan and again by attacking on Bunir, he made an assurance to him (to the Political Agent) that on account of promise with him, he has neither moved his *lashkar* in the past, nor will he move it afterwards (Shah Jahan Khan, Heir Apparent Dir to the Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral, TARC, Peshawar).

Sir Aurel Stein, who went as far as Peshmal area of Swat Kohistan in 1926, in his archeological endeavors, wrote that, "Beyond it (Peshmal) lie Kalam and other alpine tracts of the Swat Kohistan, which, though still independent, may soon become a bone of contention between him [Ruler of Swat] and the rulers of Dir and Chitral. Of course, I had promised to take care not to prejudice future developments by going beyond the territory actually held by my host (referring to Miangul Abdul Wadud) (Stein 1929: 96).

In the year 1928, the tribes of Swat Kohistan had an agreement with British Indian Government. The agreement specified that they will not permit the agents of Mehtar of Chitral, Nawab of Dir and Wali of Swat to visit their country without the permission of the British Government. Further the Government of India also agreed to use its influence in preventing all neighboring Chiefs, who were recognized by the Government from encroaching upon the independence of the tribes of the Gawri Tract of Swat Kohistan either by force of arms or by intrigues with the factions among those tribes (A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads 1983: 453).



Thus historically, the three Princely States could not interfere in Kalam, and it became a sort of buffer area. According to Wali Sahib's account, when the *jargas* came in from Kalam area in 1937 and wanted to join the State, his father was stopped by British authorities from incorporating that territory into Swat State (Barth 1995: 102). The then Political Agent of Chitral, Dir and Swat, W.R. Hay, who had visited the area in 1926, also flew over the top of Mankial Tsukai alongwith Miangul Abdul Wadud in May 1933 but not over the disputed territory of Kalam (Hay 1934: 242). It is worth mentioning that the first European to visit Swat Kohistan was the Political Agent of Chitral, Dir and Swat who visited the area in July 1908 (Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of Staff, Simla 1909: 116-117). In the last week of October 1928, another colonial British Political Agent visited the capital of Swat State and then proceeded 35 miles further up the Swat River to Churrai (Madyan) along the new un-mettled motor road which was completed by the Wali of Swat in 1927. The Political Agent continued his journey for 20 miles by horse to the Swat Kohistan. The Political Agent wrote that a halt was made at Chodgram (now Balakot) village. He was unable to proceed onwards into the Garwi tract lying beyond the territories of the Wali of Swat (NWFP Provincial Diary for the week ending the 27th October 1928, Peshawar).

The colonial British too never established its own administration in Kalam in real sense. The Political Agents had their own ideas about the region. A Political Agent, William Thomson Glover, wanted to establish government rule in Kalam. He went to Kalam and hoisted the Union Jack on a post. He also put a *Tehsildar* and some levies there. The locals however did not cooperate with them. According to Sultan-i-Rome:

They (British Indian Government) however, failed to gain confidence of the tribes, on the whole, due to which troubles kept continued; incidents of firing over the persons involved in forests operations and on the reconnaissance aeroplane took place; and attempts against the Political Tahsildar and the colonial Government staff deputed to the tract were made. The situation became so difficult, in 1930, for the colonial authorities to maintain their Political Establishment in Kalam and the adventure was to be abandoned. Hence the Tahsildar was recalled 'on 1st July 1931, i.e. after more than two years' stay there (Rome 2005: 93).

#### **Annexation of Kalam in 1947:**



When William Thomson Glover was transferred, the other Political Agents who took charge after him remain indifferent in this regard. (Barth 1995: 102). The annexation of Kalam by the forces of Swat State has an interesting background. Wali Sahib has shed light on this major event in these words:

Then, in 1947, some British official hinted to me that by midnight of August 14th there would be no British rule, so we could occupy it. So I did it, though against the will of my father. He said that the new government would be very angry. I answered that all they can do is take it back - so let them take it back! The matter rested till 1954, when I signed the first constitution of Swat (rather Supplementary Instrument of Accession) with the Government of Pakistan. I tried to have our possession of Kalam recognized; but they said that it belongs to Pakistan, and Pakistan cannot transfer its sovereignty to another party. "But", I said, "is Swat not part of Pakistan? If one part wants to join another, what is the harm?" But they never agreed, and the compromise they found amounted to the same, or was even better: to leave the area in my hands and give me absolute powers there as I had in Swat, but that I would be called "Administrator for Kalam". I was even given a yearly allowance for doing the job! (Barth 1995: 102).

However, Saranzeb Swati maintains that the intention of the Ruler of Swat was to annex Kalam on 13<sup>th</sup> August 1947. Miangul Jahanzeb (the then Wali Ahd) thought that it was the appropriate time to annex Kalam valley as the Government of Pakistan would be indulged in its own internal problems after partition. He supposed that the Government will take months to intervene on the request of Nawab of Dir and Mehtar of Chitral (Swati 1984:199-200). Saranzeb Swati further stated that prior to the annexation, the influential men of Bahrain were taken into confidence as it was not possible without their support. These men of influence included Shamshi Khan, Amir Khan, Yousaf Malak, Sufi Khan Malak, Lajbar Malak and Hazrat Ali Malak. An amount of fifty thousand rupees was allocated for the purpose but only twenty thousand rupees were consumed. The annexation was completed peacefully and without any bloodshed. After the annexation, the Political Agent followed by the Governor of the then North-West Frontier Province visited Kalam. The representative *jarga* of Kalam unanimously said that they had accepted the annexation and that Kalam was an integral part of Swat State (Swati 1984: 200). This was the last expansion of Swat State and no area was added to the State afterwards (Barth 1995: 101). Thus Kalam Valley that was kept by British as 'tribal area' and administered by Political Agent was eventually included in Swat State. As Government of

Pakistan refused to recognize the occupation and tried to force the ruler of Swat State to return to the previous position, the Wali of Swat was eager to accede to Pakistan as soon as possible to win eventual support of Pakistan in the matter (Bangash 2015: 131). The Nawab of Dir expressed great displeasure over this step by ruler of Swat State. The Mehtar of Chitral who was the other claimant, renounced his claims over Kalam on the payment of Rs. 50,000/- under an agreement with the ruler of Swat (Rome 2008: 124).

Prior to partition of Subcontinent, the Wali of Swat had to refrain from annexing Kalam due to the fact that rulers of Dir and Chitral States had much closer ties with the colonial British Government as compared to the ruler of Swat State. The British were bound to develop close ties with the rulers of these two states owing to their geographical location. The British forces, their goods including post passed through the territory of Dir State to reach Chitral. The British Indian Government in return of this service undertook that it will not interfere in the internal affairs of the Dir State (A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads 1983: 436-37). However, with the departure of the British, the ruler of Swat State developed close working relationship with the officials of Government of Pakistan. Thus the new Government partly due to its own internal issues and also due to its ties of Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb, turned a blind eye to the aggressive act of annexation of Kalam.

According to Muhammad Zaman Sagar, after taking control of Kalam, the ruler of Swat gave jobs to the people of Kalam and also started collecting *Ushr* (tithe) on crops fruits. The Ruler of Swat State also utilized the trick of choosing some influential people as his supporter (locally termed as *dalla* or faction) and provided them with fixed stipend known as '*Muajab*'. The people started calling these men as *Muajab Khor* (stipend eaters) as they were getting financial benefits from the State. The State also provided them with telephone facility. Similarly, the State constructed forts and its offices in Kalam (Sagar 2019). When Swat State administration was established in Kalam, a jeep road was extended and it went deep into Kalam valley. The prominent citizens of the State also started buying wide areas of agricultural land in Kalam, owing to its future value (Barth 1956: 60).

Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb was paid an amount of two thousand per month by Government of Pakistan for serving as 'Administrator for Kalam'. Wali Sahib after fixation of this amount wrote to the Political Agent that the allowance may be made tax free. The argument of Wali Sahib was that in the absence of this concession, he would lose a considerable part of the amount by paying its tax (Letter No.516-C/St-7, dated 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1954, Peshawar). The

Government appointed him as an agent on its behalf and was made responsible for running the administration of the area consisting of the valleys of Kalam, Ushu and Utror. Under the agreement, Wali Sahib was to collect revenues, administer justice, maintain law and order, improve means of communications, improve education, health and sanitation of the area and to improve the economic condition of the people of Kalam (File No. 58/Swat, TARC Peshawar).

In 1954, when the Supplementary Instrument of Accession was signed by the last Wali of Swat, Kalam was incorporated into Swat State. Further the formal status as a Tribal Territory was maintained and its administration was delegated to the Wali of Swat (Barth 1956: 53-54). According to Sultan-i-Rome:

Execution of the “Agreement Regarding Administration of Swat Kohistan (Tract of Kalam, Ushu and Utrot [Utror]”, in February 1954, proved another landmark in respect of the forests of Kalam at least legally because under the agreement the tract was declared a Tribal Area and the Wali was appointed as Administrator for administering the area on behalf of the Government of Pakistan (Rome 2005: 111).

Wayne Ayres Wilcox argues that the Wali of Swat coveted Kalam in 1947 and seized de facto control but that it was not recognized by the Government of Pakistan. The Wali of Swat abstained from assisting the Government in his obligations of the provincial list of the constitution until he was given Kalam. The Government of Pakistan thus as a face-saving device, appointed him as their executor for the region. In return of this, Wali Sahib agreed to make Swat State as a federated unit of Pakistan in 1954 (Wilcox 1964: 215).

The officials of Government of Pakistan wrote about the annexation, that, when independence came, the Wali of Swat occupied the territory. The Government gave careful thought to this problem and finally it was decided to keep this area under Wali’s control in the interest of good administration. Thus an agreement was executed with the Wali of Swat on 12th February 1954 whereby he was appointed as Administrator of Kalam in order to run the administration with the help of an Advisory Council (Report on the Administration of Tribal Areas, 1960-1961, P.A, Peshawar).

David Dichter wrote in 1967 about the validity of Swat State claim, “The boundaries...of Swat State are those claimed by the present Swat State Government. This qualification becomes necessary in view of a difference of opinion that exists between the two governments over the residual ownership of the Kalam area. Whereas the State Government never likes to think of Kalam as being anything but part of their State, the general opinion of the central government is that it is only temporarily being administered by Swat State on their behalf.” (Dichter 1967: 51). The Government of Pakistan also reserved the right to issue instructions for the guidance of the administrator of Kalam, when required. Under the provision of agreement executed between Government of Pakistan and the last Wali of Swat, the income and receipts from the Kalam were credited into Habib Bank and Wali Sahib operated the bank account (File No.235-246, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar). During the pre-integration period, the budget estimates pertaining to Kalam administration were submitted to the Government of Pakistan, through the local administration of Political Agent and were approved by them. However, after the integration in 1954, these estimates were approved by the Provincial Government up to the year 1960-61 (File No.235-246, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar). With effect from the financial year 1961-62, the budget estimates pertaining to the Kalam administration, both receipts and expenditures, were exhibited in the Provincial budget. These estimates were received from Wali Sahib as Administrator of Kalam, through the P.A Malakand and were examined by Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar Division. The Deputy Commissioner then sent it to the Government after incorporating it in the consolidated budget. After approval of the Government, the grants were placed at the disposal of Wali Sahib, through the Political Agent, Malakand. However, this practice of maintaining accounts of Kalam led to an anomalous position and caused considerable variation in the appropriation accounts. At times, due to the non-utilization of the sanctioned budget grant, savings occurred which were to be explained before the standing committee on appropriation accounts (File No.235-246, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar). For overcoming this difficulty and regulating the position, Government of Pakistan was considering on these angles:

1. Whether the agreement executed between the Wali of Swat and the Government may continue in its present form.
2. Whether the conditions of the agreement with Wali Sahib be revised or amended to make it conducive to the decision regarding reflection of Kalam budget in the Provincial budget.

However, these considerations were not materialized as merger of Swat State was announced on 28<sup>th</sup> July 1969 (File No.235-246, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar).

### **Conclusion:**

Thus it can be concluded that the inhabitants of Kalam tract maintained their independence for centuries. However, with the departure of the British in 1947, Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb was able to develop cordial relations with the Government of Pakistan. Thus the Government, partly due to its own internal political crises and partly due to friendly relations with the last Wali of Swat, turned a blind eye to the occupation of Kalam, on the mid night of 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> August 1947. Thus he was able to establish his rule over Kalam and indeed entire Swat Kohistan its de facto ruler. Status quo was maintained till 1954. The Government of Pakistan after lengthy correspondence and negotiations with Miangul Jahanzeb in 1953-54, appointed him as the Administrator of Kalam. He administered the area till 1969 on behalf of Government of Pakistan and provided an efficient system of governance. He was able to utilize the resources of the area in a transparent manner. Wali Sahib improved the infrastructure in the hilly area and also provided health and educational facilities to its people. This provision of basic facilities was not witnessed by the inhabitants prior to Wali Sahib's reign and is still widely acknowledged by the people of the area. After the merger of Swat State, Kalam was made part of District Swat.

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