

## COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FRONTIER: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF ITS PRACTICE IN THE PRINCELY STATE OF SWAT

ریاست سوات کی د اجتماعی ذمہ داری پہ ارہ یوہ تاریخی مطالعہ

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### Abstract

*This article examines the rule of Collective Responsibility in the Swat State, situating it within the broader framework of British colonial governance in the North-West Frontier. It traces the doctrine's evolution from a colonial instrument of coercion under the Frontier Crimes Regulation to its deliberate localization and formalization as a structured mechanism of justice, accountability, and social regulation in Swat State. The study demonstrates how the Walis of Swat, Miangul Abdul Wadud and his successor Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb, strategically adopted and adapted this principle to consolidate authority, enhance administrative cohesion, and extend the state's normative reach into local communities. Through documented instances of collective fines, community-level investigations, and enforcement of restitution, the article argues that Collective Responsibility functioned as an effective governance tool, blending tribal ethics of mutual accountability with emerging state structures. The system not only maintained law and order effectively but also fostered social cohesion, moral responsibility, and local legitimacy, illustrating how frontier states could indigenize external administrative practices to produce a culturally resonant and politically efficacious model of governance.*

**Key words:** Collective, Responsibility, Swat, Wali, British, Frontier, Jarga

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## Introduction

The princely states embody a complex and multidimensional entity encompassing various aspects of governance, administration, economy, society, culture and other aspects. Each of these domains operates with its own internal dynamics, institutions, and historical evolution.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the study of a princely state cannot be confined to a single perspective or disciplinary approach. It demands a comprehensive and multifaceted inquiry, requiring considerable effort and scholarly dedication to uncover and analyze its diverse dimensions. Exploring these varied fields, ranging from political administration and judicial systems to social reforms and infrastructural development, poses a formidable challenge for any single researcher, yet remains essential for achieving a holistic understanding of the State's historical significance. Hence, in the princely states, particularly those situated within the then North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), the subject of Collective Responsibility remains largely unexplored. The exploration of the rule of Collective Responsibility in the princely states of Chitral, Dir, and Amb equally warrants scholarly attention. A comprehensive inquiry by researchers engaged in local and regional historical studies is essential to ascertain the extent to which this policy was adopted, adapted, or resisted within these states. Such an investigation would not only fill a significant gap in the historiography of the region but also contribute to a deeper understanding of how indigenous and colonial administrative principles interacted and evolved within the princely state framework.

## An Overview of the British Policy of Collective Responsibility in the North-West Frontier

The concept of Collective Responsibility in the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) has received some attention in existing historical writing. Scholars have examined its role as a tool of governance, social regulation, and political negotiation in the British and

Pakistani era. James W. Spain, in his analysis of British administrative strategies on the North West Frontier, emphasized that the concept of collective tribal responsibility, first articulated by Colonel Coke, became the cornerstone of British tribal policy up to 1947. He argues that the policy was both straightforward and pragmatically effective, as it was grounded in an understanding of Pashtun social organization and collective psychology. According to him, the Pashtun tribes inherently functioned as cohesive social units, even though individual members might occasionally act independently. Recognizing this communal ethos, the British authorities adopted a system whereby an entire clan or tribe was held accountable for the actions of any of its individual members. This mechanism, Spain argued, encouraged internal social control since the threat of collective punishment would compel the group to regulate and restrain its members' conduct. The dependence of tribes on the settled plains for essential goods and sustenance rendered this policy particularly effective. Given that many tribesmen frequently traversed or resided in these settled zones, the British could easily enforce measures such as seizure of property or blockades, which served as powerful tools of coercion.<sup>2</sup>

Building upon the framework of collective tribal responsibility, the system was further strengthened and refined through the administrative innovations of Herbert Edwardes, who perfected the technique of blockade shortly after assuming charge as Commissioner of the Peshawar Division in October 1853. Upon taking office, Edwardes undertook a significant reorganization of the colonial approach to tribal administration. His method of enforcing order among the Pashtun tribes rested largely on the principle of economic coercion as a means of enforcing collective accountability. Whenever a tribe was found guilty of violating the government's conception of law and justice, or of sheltering wrongdoers within its fold, he imposed a total ban on the tribe's access to the Peshawar market. Through this strategy, the colonial

administration ensured that the entire community suffered collectively, whether for its direct complicity in acts of defiance or for its failure to prevent and punish individual offenders. The denial of access to the Peshawar market carried severe implications for the affected tribes. The market served as their principal outlet for obtaining daily necessities, trade goods, and essential supplies. Once barred, the tribes were compelled either to procure these necessities from distant regions or to obtain them through neighboring clans, who in turn exploited the situation by charging heavy commissions for their services.<sup>3</sup>

The scope and intensity with which the principle of Collective Responsibility was enforced under British frontier administration is clearly reflected in Section 21 of the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The section explicitly authorized comprehensive punitive measures against entire tribal communities or their sub-sections whenever they were perceived to have acted “in a hostile or unfriendly manner towards the British Government or towards persons residing in British India.” Under this provision, the Deputy Commissioner, with prior approval from the Commissioner, was empowered through a written order to undertake a series of coercive actions. These included the “(a) the seizure and detention of any or all members of a tribe, along with their movable or immovable property, regardless of individual culpability; (b) the confiscation of such property as an act of collective punishment; (c) through public proclamation, the exclusion of members of the tribe from entering British territory; and (d) the prohibition of any interaction or communication between residents of British India and the offending tribe or any of its sections.”<sup>4</sup> The centrality of the system to colonial administration is underscored by the 1922 North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee, which asserted that “to repeal the trans-frontier sections of the Frontier Crimes Regulations would be to paralyze our whole system of trans-frontier control.”<sup>5</sup> Thus the doctrine of Collective

Responsibility and its institutionalization through legal and military apparatus had become indispensable to the British strategy of governance, ensuring compliance not through individual justice, but through the collective subjugation and regulation of entire tribal societies.

Wasai and Hanif Khalil state that although the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was initially extended to the settled districts of the North-West Frontier, its effectiveness remained limited. The low conviction rate in comparison with other parts of India was primarily due to the distinct socio-cultural fabric of Pashtun society, which adhered not to British legal codes but to its own customary law called 'Pakhtunwali'<sup>6</sup>. Consequently, the local population ignored, resisted, or circumvented colonial legal procedures, perceiving them as unjust and incompatible with their traditional notions of justice and honor. Recognizing this administrative challenge and cultural incongruity, the British colonial authorities introduced special legal arrangements designed to reconcile, at least superficially, imperial governance with local customs. One such arrangement was the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation (PFCR) of 1872, later restructured as the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).<sup>7</sup> The doctrine of collective and territorial responsibility embodied in the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) served as one of the most potent instruments through which the British colonial administration asserted its authority over the Pashtun tribal territories. The mechanism became a cornerstone of colonial governance on the frontier, functioning as both a tool of control and a means of enforcing compliance within a socio-political landscape resistant to external rule. The concept, though rooted in earlier administrative practices, was institutionalized and given a formal legal framework through the promulgation of the FCR.<sup>8</sup> The Section Sections 22 and 23 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) empowered British officials, particularly the Deputy Commissioner, to penalize entire villages or tribes for crimes committed within their jurisdiction. If residents were found to have aided criminals, failed to assist in arrests, or harbored offenders,

they could be collectively fined. Likewise, if a serious crime occurred in a village, the whole community was deemed responsible unless its elders proved they had taken all reasonable steps to prevent or resolve it. These provisions established two key principles: collective responsibility, which punished an entire tribe or subtribe for the acts of a few, and territorial responsibility, which held a community accountable for any crime on its land.<sup>9</sup>

The British claimed that such measures were based on Pashtun customs such as *Baramta* and the collective defense of common land, in practice they distorted traditional norms, turning indigenous mechanisms of accountability into tools of colonial control and coercion.<sup>10</sup> The critics contend that *Baramta* in traditional Pashtun society was a customary mechanism of restitution, not a form of collective punishment. Under that practice, an aggrieved party would temporarily seize property, livestock, or even individuals belonging to another family, subtribe, or tribe to compel them to compensate for losses, repay debts, or restore wrongfully taken goods. For instance, if members of one tribe abducted individuals from another, the victimized tribe would detain an equivalent number of people from the offender's tribe to pressure them into securing the release of the captives. Likewise, the seizure of animals or property was employed to ensure the recovery of one's own possessions or the repayment of loans.<sup>11</sup> In addition, the critics note that although the British claimed to base their policy of collective punishment on the Pashtun practice of *Baramta*, the two differed fundamentally in both intent and implementation. In traditional Pashtun society, *Baramta* was a measured and reciprocal practice, where an aggrieved party could temporarily detain an equivalent number of persons, goods, or animals from the offender's group to compel restitution. It operated within moral and social limits, ensuring proportionality and respectful treatment of those held. In contrast, the British system under the FCR transformed the concept into a disproportionate and coercive mechanism of control. Instead of targeting individual offenders,



entire tribes were punished, through mass arrests, property seizures, business closures, and economic blockades, for the actions of a single person. Those detained were treated as prisoners rather than respected counterparts, and collective sanctions extended even to women, children, and the elderly. The state further imposed severe restrictions, including denial of essential services and documentation, revealing how a localized customary practice was distorted into a harsh tool of colonial domination.<sup>12</sup>

### **Collective Responsibility under the Swat State Administration (1915–1969)**

The available historical documents provide no concrete evidence that the rule of Collective Responsibility was adopted or formally implemented by Sayyid Abdul Jabbar Shah during his brief reign from April 1915 to September 1917. It was Miangul Abdul Wadud (Badshah Sahib) who during his ruling era from September 1917 to December 1949, institutionalized a system of Collective Responsibility that became a formalized element of regulation in Swat State and was subsequently incorporated into the deliberative practices of local *jargas* (tribal councils). Rather than a mere ad hoc practice, this rule operated as an articulated obligation within the polity: when an offence occurred and the individual perpetrator/perpetrators could not be readily identified or produced, responsibility shifted from the isolated individual to the wider locality. Under this arrangement the inhabitants of the affected area were required to identify and hand over the offender/offenders to the authorities or to bear a monetary or material penalty agreed upon by the ruler or the *jarga*.<sup>13</sup>

To trace the historical background of the concept of Collective Responsibility in Swat State era, it is essential to engage with primary sources produced during the British colonial period, as they provide contemporaneous and authentic insights into administrative practices and local

governance. In this regard, the “North-West Frontier Provincial Diary No. 15 for the week ending 9th April 1927” offers a significant glimpse into the application of the principle of collective or sectional responsibility within the princely state of Swat. The report records that “The Wali of Swat has imprisoned and fined certain men in Buner in connection with the recent Gujar Garhi dacoity. He has agreed that in future he will exact sectional responsibility for such offences.”<sup>14</sup> The diary provides a concise but revealing account of the administrative measures adopted by the Wali of Swat in response to a dacoity (robbery) that had taken place at Gujar Garhi and the imprisonment and fine on certain individuals in Buner for their alleged involvement in or association with the crime. The Wali thus applied the principle of sectional (or collective) responsibility in future cases of a similar nature. This means that instead of punishing only the direct offenders, the Wali committed to holding an entire section, a clan or village responsible for crimes originating within their community or territory. Such a system was a hallmark of the Walis<sup>15</sup> administration during the State era.

Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb, the last Wali of Swat (reign 1949–1969), expressed his views and its implementation about Collective Responsibility during the reign of his father and his own ruling era. He referred to collective fines and village responsibility, while describing a system where the community, rather than an individual was held accountable for maintaining law and order within its own bounds. He acknowledged that, to a Western observer, such a system might appear “harsh” or “unjust,” since it punishes many for the acts of one. However, Miangul Jahanzeb justified it on pragmatic and moral grounds, arguing that within the specific cultural and social structure of Swat, such a practice ensured justice, social harmony, and deterrence.<sup>16</sup> According to him, collective responsibility functioned not as a tool of oppression, but as a mechanism of social cohesion and self-regulation. His example of a crop-burning incident illustrates this point vividly.



If a person's field was destroyed by an unknown perpetrator, the entire village was obliged to compensate the victim. The last Wali explained that this approach created a system of mutual vigilance and moral accountability. The villagers would ensure that no such act occurred again, for they themselves would bear the burden of compensation. In his words, "they will see that the aggrieved man obtains more than he lost, and so they will never do it again."<sup>17</sup> In this way, the system served as an effective deterrent, preventing further offences through the natural mechanism of community pressure rather than through formal courts or punitive policing. The last Wali further lightened his tone by calling this practice "self-help," suggesting that the system was a communal form of assistance and restitution rather than a punitive fine. To him, it was not about punishment for its own sake, but about reinforcing the principle that every individual is part of a moral community responsible for upholding justice and peace. In cases of serious crimes, such as murder, the Wali explained that the principle was extended: a collective fine could be imposed on an entire village or tribe until the culprit was produced before the authorities. This system effectively mobilized communal responsibility for maintaining law and order, as the community itself became the enforcer of justice. While he admitted that it was a "crude procedure," he emphasized that it "worked very well" in maintaining peace and stability in the State.

Interestingly, while the Walis of Swat, both Miangul Abdul Wadud and his successor Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb encouraged a degree of local legislative autonomy, allowing different regions within the State to frame indigenous laws in accordance with their customs, traditions, and socio-cultural norms, there remained certain foundational principles that were uniformly enforced across the State. They recognized that Swat State was not a monolithic society; rather, it was composed of diverse tribal communities and each possessing its own customary codes (*riwaj*). Hence, in matters of minor civil and civil disputes, local *jargas* were granted the

freedom to interpret and apply rules that aligned with their regional traditions.<sup>18</sup> However, despite this decentralization, the principle of Collective Responsibility remained a centralized and inviolable rule of governance. Its universality across Swat State reveals that it was viewed not as an ordinary regulation but as a cornerstone for law enforcement. The Walis considered it indispensable for ensuring stability in a society where the state apparatus was limited in reach, and where social cohesion and deterrence depended heavily on communal accountability. Thus from an administrative standpoint, maintaining uniformity in the application of Collective Responsibility ensured a standardized response to crime and disorder, regardless of local variations in custom or geography.

Functionally, the rule of Collective Responsibility served several complementary purposes. First, it translated private wrongdoing into a communal problem, thereby mobilizing local social pressure and informal mechanisms of surveillance to facilitate the discovery and surrender of culprits. Second, by threatening collective sanction, the rule created a powerful deterrent against concealment and passive acquiescence: families and communities, aware that the cost of noncooperation would fall on all, had strong incentive to investigate, discipline, or ostracize the wrongdoer internally. Third, the policy allowed the state to extend its normative reach into local social structures without relying solely on formal police procedures; the *jarga*, with its customary authority, became the intermediary through which state expectations were translated into local action.

Fredrik Barth underscores that the Swat State was not a mere replication of external political systems but an emergent political structure, evolving through the complex interpenetration of indigenous social organization and selectively adopted administrative models.

As he notes, the State's governmental system "was not simply copied and introduced from elsewhere," but took shape through adaptation—drawing upon diverse institutional precedents such as the bodyguard tradition of Dir, the tax-auctioning practices of Mughal India, the *tahsil* divisions of British India, and the Islamic institution of *ushur*.<sup>19</sup> Within this process, however, certain administrative mechanisms, notably the rule of Collective Responsibility, appear to reflect a thoughtful borrowing from British frontier governance. The British had institutionalized the principle of collective punishment across the North-West Frontier as a means of enforcing order and ensuring compliance in tribal societies. Its subsequent adoption in Swat State reveals both the influence of colonial administrative thought and the Wali's pragmatic adaptation of it to local conditions. Yet, rather than reproducing it mechanically, the Walis recontextualized the principle within its own moral and tribal codes, embedding it in the existing networks of kinship, customary justice, and community accountability. In this way, Collective Responsibility became not merely an imported legal device but a localized instrument of governance, aligning external bureaucratic rationality with internal norms of collective obligation. Thus, the incorporation of Collective Responsibility into Swat's administrative system illustrates precisely what Barth described as the State's 'emergent character', an evolving polity that synthesized external influences and indigenous practices into a distinctive and contextually grounded form of governance.<sup>20</sup>

The Swat State's experience thus offers a rich case for understanding how legal pluralism, local authority structures, and state objectives can combine to produce a distinctive system of accountability, one that was effective in maintaining order in its context, yet also raises enduring questions about fairness, proportionality, and the limits of collective sanction. Proponents would argue that collective responsibility was efficient, culturally congruent, and effective in contexts where formal investigative capacity was limited. It aligned with existing norms of mutual

accountability and thus produced rapid, visible outcomes that reinforced public confidence in governance. To the critics, both contemporary and modern, the Collective Responsibility “may not sound so good” and raise questions on its implementation and potential abuse.<sup>21</sup>

### **Collective Responsibility under the Walis: Case Studies from Swat State Era**

An illustrative example of the application of Collective Responsibility during the ruling period of Miangul Abdul Wadud may be cited in connection with an incident that occurred in one of the villages of Swat. According to historical accounts, a woman of ill repute was murdered one night, and her body was subsequently discarded along the main road passing through the village. Upon learning of this act, the Ruler expressed his profound displeasure. It is noteworthy that his anger was not primarily directed at the murder itself, as the villagers explained that the woman had been known for her immoral activities. Rather, his outrage stemmed from the fact that her corpse had been thrown on crown land, an act regarded as a direct affront to state authority and public decency. In response, Miangul Abdul Wadud invoked the principle of Collective Responsibility, imposing a substantial fine of Rs. 1,00,000 (one lakh rupees) upon the entire village. The villagers were given the choice either to produce the individual responsible for the act or to pay the fine collectively. Unable to identify or surrender the perpetrator, the villagers opted to pay the fine among them, thereby fulfilling the decree of the ruler.<sup>22</sup>

An elder also narrates another telling example that vividly illustrates the working of the system of Collective Responsibility under the rule of the two Walis of Swat. It is said that in Kanju village (tehsil Kabal), a schoolboy once threw a stone at a passing bus, breaking its front windshield. When the matter was reported to the authorities, the principle of Collective Responsibility was immediately invoked. The village elders were called upon to identify and

produce the culprit. However, despite inquiries and internal deliberations, the villagers failed to trace or hand over the guilty boy. Consequently, the whole village was fined “eight annas”, a small but symbolic amount that represented the community’s shared obligation for the misconduct of one of its members. In accordance with the decree, the villagers collectively gathered the sum, which was then paid to the aggrieved party as compensation for the damage caused.<sup>23</sup>

Another noteworthy illustration reflecting both the firmness and fairness of the system of Collective Responsibility under the last Wali of Swat is recounted from one of his tours to Upper Swat. During the visit, Wali Sahib and his entourage came across a man standing by the roadside with his donkey, appearing distressed. Upon inquiry, the man explained that he had been transporting a load of salt to Kalam, and after halting to rest for a while, he awoke to find that his salt had been stolen. Hearing the man’s account, the last Wali immediately directed that salt be purchased for the man from the State treasury, thus compensating him for his loss on the spot. At the same time, he turned to the local elders of the area, instructing them to locate and produce the thief before 9 a.m. the following morning, warning that failure to do so would result in severe punishment. The elders, aware of the Wali’s resolute approach to law enforcement, began investigating without delay. Remarkably, before the appointed hour the next morning, the thief himself appeared and presented before Wali Sahib, confessing his guilt.<sup>24</sup>

An elder, Miraj Gul, narrates an account that further illustrates the efficiency and deterrent power of the system of justice, grounded in the principle of Collective Responsibility. He recalls that during the era of the last Wali of Swat, cases of serious nature such as murder were resolved with remarkable speed and decisiveness. According to Miraj Gul, “During the era of the Wali of Swat, a murder case was solved only in one week; due to this swift justice, no one dared to commit

murder or any kind of sin.”<sup>25</sup> He recounts one particular incident when a man murdered another within the town. Upon receiving the report, Wali Sahib immediately dispatched his police and issued a strict order to the local community: they were to produce the murderer by 2:00 p.m. the next day, failing which the entire village would be summoned to Saidu Sharif, where the Wali himself would conduct an on-the-spot inquiry and deliver punishment collectively. Faced with this stern warning and aware of the ruler’s uncompromising approach toward justice, the community mobilized at once. They launched a thorough search throughout the night, and by the specified time the following day, the culprit was apprehended and presented before the Wali of Swat. Miraj Gul further emphasizes that this incident had a lasting impact on communal behavior. From that day until the end of the Swat State’s rule, there was not a single case of murder in their village.<sup>26</sup>

## Conclusion

The history of Collective Responsibility during the Walis era demonstrates that mechanisms of governance were neither simple imitations of colonial systems nor static continuations of tribal custom. Rather, they emerged through a complex process of negotiation, adaptation, and translation between indigenous social realities and the administrative rationalities of the time. The two Walis of Swat operated in a context where traditional codes of Pakhtunwali and emerging bureaucratic structures had to coexist. Their task, therefore, was not merely to replicate external models but to indigenize them in ways that resonated with local notions of justice, honor, and communal order. The Swat State’s adoption and localization of the doctrine of Collective Responsibility, originally institutionalized under the British Frontier Crimes Regulation, illustrates how an imported framework of control was reinterpreted to serve internal imperatives of order, legitimacy, and state formation. By holding communities accountable for the actions of



individuals, the Walis of Swat effectively mobilized social cohesion as a substitute for formal administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms that the nascent state lacked in its early decades. This system encouraged communities to act as self-regulating entities, ensuring discipline and cooperation within their ranks while reinforcing loyalty to the central authority. Miangul Abdul Wadud and his successor, Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb, further refined this approach, transforming Collective Responsibility from a coercive colonial instrument into a participatory mechanism of governance. In their hands, it became not only a means of maintaining order but also a moral practice grounded in indigenous values restitution, and accountability. The people in the State came to perceive it less as an imposition and more as an extension of their own communal traditions of justice and responsibility. Thus, the system of Collective Responsibility in the Swat State era should be understood as a foundational element of its political modernity, an indigenous technology of rule that bridged the gap between tribal governance and early modern statecraft. It enabled the Walis to consolidate authority, extend control across difficult terrain, and sustain legitimacy in a geographically fragmented and socially segmented polity. In this sense, Swat's experience demonstrates that political modernization in the frontier states was not merely a product of external influence, but a negotiated process through which local leaders redefined governance in culturally meaningful and administratively effective ways.

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<sup>1</sup> Yaqoob Khan Bangash, *A Princely Affair: The Accession and Integration of the Princely States of Pakistan, 1947–1955* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 13.

<sup>2</sup> James W. Spain, *Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Political Problems of a Borderland* (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1959), 159.

<sup>3</sup> Spain, *Pakistan's North-West Frontier*, 159-160.

<sup>4</sup> Spain, *Pakistan's North-West Frontier*, 226-227.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>6</sup> *Pashtunwali* is the traditional socio-ethical and legal code guiding Pashtun life, encompassing some principles and serving as both a moral framework and a system of customary law regulating social relations and conflict resolution among Pashtuns.

<sup>7</sup> Wasai and Hanif Khalil, "Exploitation of Pashtun's Socio-Cultural Institutions by the Britishers: A Case Study of Jirga and Collective Responsibility," *Pakistan: Bi-Annual Research Journal* 58 (January-June 2021), 15.

<sup>8</sup> Wasai and Khalil, "Exploitation of Pashtun's Socio-Cultural Institutions," 19.

<sup>9</sup> Wasai and Khalil, "Exploitation of Pashtun's Socio-Cultural Institutions," 22.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Wasai and Khalil, "Exploitation of Pashtun's Socio-Cultural Institutions," 21-22.

<sup>13</sup> Fredrik Barth, *The Last Wali of Swat: An Autobiography as Told to Fredrik Barth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 56.

<sup>14</sup> *North West Frontier Provincial Diary* No. 15 for the week ending 9 April 1927, File No. 56-67, Confidential Diaries, Bundle No. 54 (1919-1930), List No. 1, Deputy Commissioner Peshawar File, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar.

<sup>15</sup> The term/title "Walis" refers to Miangul Abdul Wadud and his son Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb, who successively ruled the State of Swat from 1917 to 1969.

<sup>16</sup> Barth, *The Last Wali of Swat*, 56.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid..

<sup>18</sup> Ashraf Altaf Hussain, *The Story of Swat as Told by the Founder Miangul Abdul Wadud Bacha Sahib to Muhammad Asif Khan* (Peshawar: Ferozsons Limited, 1962), 100.

<sup>19</sup> Barth, *The Last Wali*, Epilogue, 156.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Barth, *The Last Wali of Swat*, 56.

<sup>22</sup> Fazal Raziq Shahab, "Concept of Collective Responsibility in Pre-State and State Era", Swat Encyclopedia (blog), August 2020, <https://swatencyclopedia.com/en/2020/08/2665/>.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Tasir Jan, age 75, Telli Abad, Kanju, Tehsil Kabal, Swat, March 15, 2023.

<sup>24</sup> Aftab Ahmed and Mujahid Torwali, "Peoples' Stories during the Rule of the Last Wali of Swat, Miangul Jahanzeb (1949-1969)," *THAAP Journal 2016: People's History of Pakistan*, 16.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ahmed and Torwali, "Peoples' Stories during the Rule of the Last Wali of Swat," 17.