

The Taliban Governmentality: Its Impact on Human Rights in Post-2021 Afghanistan

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Abstract

The Taliban's return to power in August 2021 has significantly transformed the political and social structures of Afghanistan. The democratic governance has been dismantled and replaced with an authoritarian system based upon a strict interpretation of Sharia law. They precipitated widespread human rights restrictions. By applying Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality, this study examines how the Taliban governance model restructures the conduct of individuals and institutions, and its impact on human rights, particularly women's rights, the rights of ethnic minorities, and freedom of expression. An interpretive qualitative case-study design methodology is used to triangulate purposive primary data from Afghan students and civilians, with secondary sources such as, UN, NGO, academic, and credible media reports. This indicates that the Taliban deploys sovereign, disciplinary, and pastoral forms of power to produce a deeply embedded biopolitical governmentality by means of legal decrees, the Ministry for Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, media censorship, and curricular reform, which normalize gender exclusion, ethnic marginalization, and legal impunity processes. The empirical evidence shows that they curtailed female education and employment, increased public corporal punishment, and arbitrary detentions. Hence, the Taliban governmentality systematically undermines human rights and social

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cohesion. They adopted exclusive governance policies by not prioritizing the protection of vulnerable groups, civic space, and opposing grassroots resilience. International accountability is urgently needed for the protection of the human rights of millions of Afghan people.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Governmentality, Biopolitics, Human Rights, Gender Inequality, Ethnic Marginalization, Media Censorship, Surveillance, Authoritarian Governance.

Introduction

The fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 marked a major political and ideological defeat for the United States and its allies. After the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, the Afghan government and its 300,000-strong army collapsed rapidly. Many soldiers defected to the Taliban, who demanded unconditional surrender and refused to fight against their countrymen. There were multiple reasons for their surrender, but one of the core issues was that Afghan forces did not want to fight for what they saw as a corrupt and externally backed government under Ashraf Ghani, especially for such low salaries³. This created a political and social environment that enabled the Taliban to take over Kabul in 2021, under the post-withdrawal conditions. A similar situation unfolded during their first regime in 1996, under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar, when they attacked and took control of Kandahar.⁴

The Taliban became well-known during their first regime for their strict interpretation of Islamic Sharia law, which severely restricted freedoms, particularly for women and minority

³ Ali, Tariq. *The Forty-Year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold*. London; New York: Verso, 2021.

⁴ Ibid.

groups like the Hazara.⁵ In their current authoritarian regime, they are reinstating similar oppressive measures, despite initially claiming to adopt a more moderate stance regarding women's rights within an Islamic framework. However, recent developments indicate a return to harsh policies like those in their earlier rule.

This research analyses the Taliban governance post-2021 through the lens of **governmentality**, a concept developed by Michel Foucault. Governmentality refers to the conduct of conduct (the Art of Government), which involves how a regime maintains power through ideological dominance, coercive methods, and restrictive laws.⁶ In the case of the Taliban, this concept is particularly relevant, as their governance relies on a combination of religious doctrine and cultural norms to control the population of Afghanistan. By examining how Taliban authoritarianism impacts human rights, especially women's rights, minority rights, and freedom of the media, this research aims to provide insights into the long-term implications of their rule in Afghanistan.

French philosopher Michel Foucault introduced the concept of governmentality. This concept refers to the strategies and techniques governments use to regulate their populations and manage the conduct of individuals.⁷ Authoritarian governmentality refers to a form of government that suppresses dissent, restricts freedom, and employs force and deterrence to ensure compliance. The Taliban's strict interpretation of Islamic law manifests this authoritarian governmentality in

⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022).

⁶ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Allen Lane, 1977).

⁷ Richard Huff, "Governmentality," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, last modified May 6, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/governmentality>.

Afghanistan, as it serves both as a moral framework and a tool for maintaining power. The Taliban's governance represents an attempt to shape society according to their vision of Islamic values. This system of rules encompasses control over various aspects that reinforce the Taliban's ideological dominance, such as their influence over religious institutions, educational systems, and the media.

The current Taliban government has been successful in curtailing opium cultivation and suppressing insurgencies, like fighting against Islamic State Khorasan (ISK).⁸ However, they are also violating various human rights laws, particularly concerning women's rights, minority rights, ethnic persecution, and freedom of speech and the press. Women now require a male escort or guardian for mobility. The current Taliban government continues to follow the policies of previous regimes, particularly the Kandhari Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada.⁹ This leadership is inclined towards the separation of women, although some factions within the Taliban express support for women's rights as defined by Sharia law.

Similarly, the Haqqani Network, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, and the Kabul Taliban, associated with figures like Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob (the son of Mullah Mohammad Omar) and Abdul Ghani Baradar, are part of this governance structure. However, they face challenges from the Kandhari leadership, which the Taliban government considers its spiritual center. Currently, girls above the sixth grade are banned from receiving an education, and Afghan women

⁸ W. Dobrowolski, "Determinants and Prospects for the Development of the Opiate Economy in Afghanistan," *Humanities and Social Sciences* 31, no. 1 (2024): 49–63.

⁹ Peter Mills, "Taliban Governance in Afghanistan," *Institute for the Study of War*, 2024, 22–28.

face significant limitations in employment, mobility, and freedom of the press.¹⁰ These actions violate international human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

Afghanistan has a very diverse ethnic and religious population. Historically, minority groups like the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras have faced marginalization. The Taliban, predominantly Pashtun, have been accused of targeting non-Pashtun ethnic groups, particularly the Hazara Shia minority.¹¹ Thus, the Taliban's authoritarian government enforces Pashtun dominance by exacerbating ethnic and sectarian tensions. They are systematically marginalizing these minority groups.

Freedom of the press and speech has been significantly restricted under Taliban rule. Journalists face violence, arrests, and harassment for reporting on government actions and human rights abuses. Independent media has largely been shut down, and the Taliban controls the flow of information to promote their ideological and political agenda.¹² A key component of Taliban authoritarian governmentality is the control of the press and media, suppressing and limiting public access to critical and alternative perspectives.

Another prominent aspect of the Taliban's authoritarian rule is their justice system. According to the Amnesty International report of 2023, their interpretation of Islamic Sharia law

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Anatol Lieven, "An Afghan Tragedy: The Pashtuns, the Taliban and the State," *Survival* 63, no. 3 (2021): 7–36.

¹² Abubakar Siddique, "This Is What It's Like to Be a Journalist Under Taliban Rule," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, May 3, 2024, <https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-press-freedom-journalists-media/32925395.html>.

is rigid.¹³ It often results in harsh punishments such as flogging, hand-cutting, public execution, and stoning for crimes like adultery, robbery, and murder. These punishments were also used during their first tenure. The Taliban publicly punishes individuals to deter crime and demonstrate their control over morality and law enforcement, reinforcing their power through fear and intimidation.¹⁴

While the Taliban promised to adopt a more moderate approach to governance, reports indicate a lack of transparency in their legal justice system. Trials are often conducted without proper legal representation or the possibility of appeal. By doing this, the Taliban aim to centralize judicial authority and eliminate independent checks on their power.¹⁵ Most international organizations condemn the reimplementation of such a punitive justice system. For example, organizations like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have condemned these human rights violations in Afghanistan. They demand swift and responsive measures to secure basic human rights for the Afghan people.

Methodology

This study employs an interpretive qualitative methodology to investigate the Taliban's governance practices in Afghanistan since their return to power in 2021, with a particular focus on

¹³ Amnesty International, *Afghanistan: The Taliban's War on Women* (London: Amnesty International, 2023), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa11/7235/2023/en/>.

¹⁴ Amnesty International, *Afghanistan: The Taliban's War on Women*.

¹⁵ Aamir Khan Durrani and Aqsa, "The Future of Afghanistan under Taliban-Led Regime: Challenges and," *Liberal Arts & Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)* (2024): 15–16.

how these practices affect social cohesion, stability, and human rights. The interpretive approach is particularly well-suited for this research, as it enables an in-depth exploration of subjective meanings, lived realities, and the social structures that have emerged under authoritarian rule. Foucault's concept of governmentality provides the theoretical framework, offering critical insight into the indirect mechanisms of control, surveillance, and regulation that shape Afghan society. A case study design has been adopted to allow for a context-specific and detailed examination of Afghanistan's unique socio-political dynamics under the Taliban, with special attention to the experiences of women, ethnic minorities, and marginalized groups. Data for this study were gathered from both primary and secondary sources to ensure depth, validity, and triangulation. Primary data were collected through purposive sampling, targeting Afghan students and civilians whose direct experiences under Taliban rule provide valuable perspectives on the constraints placed on education, mobility, expression, and daily life. The purposive sampling method was selected because it allowed for the inclusion of participants who are most knowledgeable and directly affected by the Taliban's policies, thereby ensuring the relevance of responses. In addition, a wide range of secondary sources, including academic literature, UN and NGO reports, human rights documentation, and credible international and Afghan media, were analyzed to contextualize these lived experiences and strengthen the reliability of findings. Bringing together primary accounts and secondary evidence, this methodology not only captures the ideological and authoritarian strategies employed by the Taliban to regulate Afghan society but also situates these practices within broader debates on governance, justice, and human rights, offering important implications for both Afghanistan and regional stability.

Since 2021, a paradigm shift has occurred in the Taliban's policies from democratic aspirations to religious authoritarianism. This significantly impacted the daily lives of the Afghan people, especially for youth in educational institutions. We conducted a survey and collected data from 76 Afghan students. Although there were multiple challenges, such as fear, language barriers, and limited digital access. This explains the Taliban's use of institutions, moral authorities, and surveillance to reshape politically obedient and socially regulated individuals. Hence, the data is supported by international organizations, which highlight the broader patterns of systematic repression. The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first part applies Foucauldian theory to student experiences, which primarily focus on how education, gender, and fear are used as instruments of social control. The second part examines documented human rights violations since 2021. Together, using both survey findings and external reports, these analyses reveal how the Afghans navigate fear, silence, and resistance under the shadow of the Taliban governmentality.

4.1 Methodological Note: Conducting Research Under Authoritarian Constraint

The lived experiences of Afghan students who have lived under the Taliban rule since the Taliban's return to power in August 2021 are examined in this chapter using original primary data gathered through a self-designed survey. The goal was to look into how Taliban rule affected freedom, education, and day-to-day living, particularly in light of Michel Foucault's theory of governmentality. More than nine hundred people received this survey, which was created for Afghan citizens and academics. Only 76 valid responses were gathered. The low response rate was not due to a lack of interest but due to the oppressive conditions under which the study was conducted. The process of gathering data revealed a number of critical issues. First, many people were unable to participate, especially those who lived in rural areas, due to digital and

infrastructure barriers, such as a lack of technology or reliable access to the internet. Second, because the survey was conducted in English, there were language barriers. Since they could only read in Pashto, Dari, or Farsi, many potential respondents were unable to finish the survey because of a language barrier. Lastly, the general atmosphere of fear was the main barrier to mistrust. Even though confidentiality was guaranteed but many people were afraid of being observed or facing the consequences. Open communication and critical responses were discouraged in the authoritarian environment. Despite these drawbacks, the replies provide insightful information about how Afghan students view, adjust to, or resist the Taliban rule. Although this qualitative dataset is not statistically valid, it has been examined in conjunction with reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, and other reputable organizations. Despite their small number, these voices provide convincing evidence of the complex relationship between governmentality and human rights in Afghanistan.

Foucauldian Analysis Of Afghan Student Experience

This section shifts from the theoretical foundation established in earlier chapters about Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality to its practical application in the analysis of empirical evidence. This section of the study does not repeat theoretical arguments that defined governmentality as the "art of government" and "conduct of conduct." The main objective is to utilize this Foucauldian perspective to analyze the lived experiences of Afghan students, as shown in our survey results (Appendix). Through an analysis of their responses, we try to clarify the manifestation of the Taliban's governance strategies, comprising biopolitical control, disciplinary measures, and the interplay of power and knowledge, in the contexts of education, gendered moral

regulation, surveillance, and emerging forms of resistance. This examination will show the practical application of governmentality in examining the complicated, multidimensional system of control implemented by the current regime.

Results and Discussions

Education as a Tool of Ideological Governance

The Taliban's educational strategy illustrates its ideological control, utilizing schools not merely for education but as an effective tool for shaping future generations and enforcing a unique "Islamic Subjectivity." The regime's prompt and ongoing prohibitions on girls' education, especially beyond the primary level, together with its dramatic curriculum changes, are intentional actions within a comprehensive biopolitical framework. This oversight of education directly controls the "existence" of the populace by limiting options and pathways for half of Afghanistan's youth, so systematically constructing a society compatible with the Taliban's strict ideological perspective.

Survey replies effectively highlight this biopolitical influence. A student states, "The absence of education for women precludes their participation in politics," explicitly illustrating the connection between lack of education and the marginalization of women in public and political spheres. This shows a biopolitical strategy aimed at regulating the population by limiting the growth and involvement of a significant demographic generation. Another respondent's contest, "The ban on women's education should be lifted," along with the emphatic reiteration, "Education, education, and education," highlights the critical significance of this right for students. The line,

"Some rights are acceptable, but schools are not; they close the schools," indicates the selective implementation of rights, a disciplinary strategy wherein certain liberties are allowed while important ones, such as education, are repressed to sustain control. This exposes a distinct opposition to the regime's biopolitical objectives.

These comments from students correspond with Foucault's concept of disciplinary authority, wherein the curriculum itself serves as an area of control. The elimination of disciplines such as biology, history, culture, arts, and physical education, replaced by a new emphasis on religious studies and agriculture, constitutes a calculated effort to manipulate "truth" and provides a particular form of knowledge that reinforces the regime's narrative. The classroom, within this framework, is transformed into an instrument for subjectivation, designed to develop individuals who assimilate the regime's rules as well as its vision of an Islamic Emirate. Control over education beyond mere access; it enters the foundation and environment of learning, showing how governmentality functions through subtle yet pervasive methods to influence individual cognitive and behavioral processes.

Gendered Moral Regulation

The Taliban's rule is fundamentally defined by its comprehensive and strict system of gendered moral regulation, which acts as the main form of biopolitical control. This restriction goes beyond simple dress regulations, affecting all facets of women's public and private lives, to redefine their social positions and limit their freedoms. This represents governmentality, when the "conduct of conduct" is sharply oriented at the female demographic to construct a particular social order.

Survey results demonstrate the effects of these rules. The statement, "Nothing the women are not allowed to go anywhere," clearly shows the severe restrictions imposed on women's mobility, an important aspect of their public existence. Another person remarked, "Females are encountering numerous challenges under the current Taliban regime." These physical restrictions are disciplinary measures that restrict women's access to school, employment, and social engagement, thereby excluding them from the public domain. The survey's responses effectively show this biopolitical influence, especially regarding female education. A student states, "The absence of education for women prohibits their participation in politics," clearly highlighting the connection between educational deprivation and the marginalization of women in public and political spheres. This is a biopolitical strategy aimed at regulating the population by limiting the development or participation of a substantial segment of the population. A respondent said that, "The ban on women's education should be lifted," along with the insistent reiteration, "Women's education," highlights the critical significance of this right to the students, suggesting an individual hostility to the regime's biopolitical agenda.

An excellent comment questions the legitimacy of the educational bans: "Women constitute half of the population in the country; they deserve equitable treatment and possess the right to education. There is no Ayat or Hadith that prohibits women's education in Islam." We strongly believe that there would be no educational system for women to study in Afghanistan under Taliban governance. The statement not only expresses the unfairness but also challenges the Taliban's religious rationale, revealing a critical engagement with the regime's claims of knowledge and power. The statement, "Some rights are acceptable, but schools are not; they close the schools," highlights the selective enforcement of rights, a repressive strategy in which certain liberties are

permitted but fundamental ones, such as education, are subjugated for purposes of control. The reference to "gender restrictions" as an obstacle to obtaining education or knowledge directly associates the educational issue with the regime's gender policies.

This gender moral control exemplifies biopolitical governance by directly influencing women's lives through behavioral control, restricting their choices, and defining their presence within the social framework. It is an organized effort to create a particular type of female subject, one who is dependent, restricted, and whose conduct is always monitored and controlled. The influence of these laws is not merely physical but profoundly psychological, developing an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship, as individuals absorb the regime's expectations and modify their behavior accordingly. Additionally, one respondent observed a change "From Strickness into little flexibility," indicating a more complex view of the regime's changing strategy, even while the fundamental limitations are still in place.

Surveillance and Fear as Everyday Discipline

The Taliban's use of surveillance and instilling fear as powerful tools of daily discipline reflects Foucault's idea of panopticism, in which people receive the scrutiny of authority and control their conduct. Through both visible and invisible means, this system extends the regime's authority well beyond open displays of oppression into everyday life.

Responses from student surveys clearly show how these restrictions have a chilling effect. This internalized fear and self-censorship are effectively captured by the statement, "Everything is okay until I don't speak against them." This is a direct result of panoptic surveillance, where people

control their speech and behavior because they are continuously at risk of being observed. Responses such as "no any personal safety," "No idea," "None," "I don't have," "NILL," "Not know," and "No concern" when asked about personal safety concerns are meant to highlight the overall feeling of insecurity. These differing answers, especially the repeated "No idea" or flat "None," can point to a generalized atmosphere of anxiety and hesitation to express particular fears, which is a kind of self-censorship in its own. The statement, "Females are facing multiple challenges in the current Taliban rule," also highlights a widespread feeling of insecurity.

This widespread fear encourages a social climate in which obedience becomes a survival strategy and trust is undermined. The threat of being watched is sufficient for the regime to enforce obedience; physical monitoring of every person is not necessary at all times. Fear becomes internalized as a result of this panoptic effect, which turns external disciplinary pressures into internal behavioral limitations. Students in particular must negotiate a world where social interactions are monitored, academic freedom is restricted, and even personal expression is closely examined. This self-control is motivated by the fear of punishment for rebellion, which could include detention, public humiliation, or more severe punishments.

Therefore, disciplinary power can function without continual, visible violence, as the Taliban's governance model highlights. The daily discipline is upheld by the hidden but common systems of surveillance and the fear it inspires, while public punishments function as reminders of sovereign power. Furthermore, the physical force, this system seeks to create "docile bodies" by influencing the public's perception, which forces them to accept the rules of the regime and function as agents of their oppression.

Hope, Resistance, and Counter-Conduct

Despite the Taliban's ubiquitous repression and sophisticated control mechanisms, survey findings show considerable signals of hope, resistance, and what Foucault called "counter-conduct." This concept emphasizes that even within authoritarian regimes, control is never absolute, and people find ways to resist, challenge, or evade the mandated behavior. Afghan students frequently express their resistance in subtle yet powerful ways, such as expressing fantasies of a different future, pursuing migration, or articulating calls for fundamental change.

The desire for an end to the current system is obvious in replies like, "Sometimes I am curious about when this government ends and I can continue my schooling or college." This statement is more than just a personal hope; it is a shared desire for the restoration of education and a return to a life free of the Taliban's oppressive rule. This hope, while unspoken, feeds a resistance that precludes total subjectivation. It represents an internal unwillingness to fully integrate imposed rules, as well as a continual desire for self-determination. Migration, as shown by the respondent's statement "Now I'm out of the country," is another potent kind of counter-conduct. For those who can, leaving Afghanistan means rejecting the Taliban's enforced reality and seeking freedom and opportunity elsewhere. While a physical departure, it is also a symbolic act of disobedience against the regime's attempts to restrict individual life paths and objectives.

Aside from these overt gestures, counter-conduct might take more subtle forms. One especially smart remark describes a multifaceted approach to change: "1. Focus on public needs

and meet them. 2, compromise with past government leaders and find a way to bring them back to the country; otherwise, they would be used as a tool in the struggle against the current government. 3. "Open the door to education for girls; we need their participation in the medical and IT fields." This detailed proposal for policy changes, which includes a focus on public needs, reconciliation, and, most importantly, girls' education and women's participation in key sectors, demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of societal needs and a clear vision for an alternative future, despite the risks associated with expressing such opinions. This active expression of an alternative governance paradigm creates a significant act of counter-conduct.

Another student's statement, "Is democrats, I can't live with Taliban because I'm concerned about my sister's education, my brothers are unemployed because they were members of the previous government, so I'm not happy with this government," demonstrates a strong personal and ideological opposition to the regime, motivated by the direct impact on their family and the denial of fundamental rights. This personal stake encourages a type of resistance based on individual and familial well-being. Foucault's concept of counter-conduct points out that resistance does not have to be a great, revolutionary act; it can live within the very fabric of the authoritarian order, as individuals negotiate and gradually disrupt the "conduct of conduct."

Afghan youth, particularly students, emerge as key future change agents, even in these limited conditions. Their continual pursuit of knowledge, ambitions for a different future, and willingness to express disagreement, however gently, highlight the fundamental limitations of even the most powerful forms of governmentality. Their experiences demonstrate that, while authority seeks to shape and dominate, it also creates opportunities for resistance, suggesting that human

nature, particularly among the younger generation, continues to strive for freedom and self-determination despite formidable odds.

Human Rights Violations Under Taliban Rule (2021–2025)

Post-2021, Afghanistan had signed an official agreement to follow international human rights standards by accepting most of the main international human rights treaties. Afghanistan signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 2003, following the first Taliban regime collapsed.¹⁶ Article 22 of the 2004 Constitution provided very clear that gender discrimination was not allowed, and Article 7 said that the state shall abide by the UN Charter, international treaties, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. During this time, there were significant improvements in basic liberties and inclusive governance.¹⁷ Before August 2021, women made up 27% of the lower house of parliament, 22% of the upper house, and 30% of the civil service.¹⁸ The Mass Media Law of 2009 protected free speech, and the Law on Access to Information (2017) tried to make the government more transparent. As well, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the Human Rights Support Unit (HRSU)

¹⁶ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Afghanistan: Opening Statement by the State under Review, 46th Session of the Universal Periodic Review* (Geneva: United Nations, 2024), https://uprmeetings.ohchr.org/Sessions/46/Afghanistan/DL_UPRDocuments/Afghanistan_State%20under%20review_opening%20statement.docx.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Samim, “International Legal Mechanisms to Safeguard Women’s Rights: An Analysis of Afghan Women’s Rights under Taliban Rule,” *Yale Journal of International Law* (January 26, 2025), <https://yjil.yale.edu/posts/2025-01-26-international-legal-mechanisms-to-safeguard-womens-rights-an-analysis-of-afghan>.

of the Ministry of Justice were set up to protect human rights and carry out suggestions for improvement.¹⁹

The Taliban's return in August 2021 was a sudden and significant setback for these rights. The 2004 Constitution was quickly put on hold, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was an important part of advancing women's rights, was shut down and replaced with the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV).²⁰ This new ministry now issues harsh orders. The AIHRC was also shut down, which made the human rights system weaker. The de facto government officials are systematically breaking down existing human rights institutions, which shows that they want to get rid of any legal or institutional limits on their power. It is an attack on the very structure of human rights protection, trying to replace a rights-based system of government with one that is based only on their extreme interpretation of religious law.²¹ This method makes it very hard to follow international human rights standards again in the future because the ways to do so have been removed.

The international community says that the Taliban must follow Afghanistan's international human rights obligations, especially CEDAW, even if they are in charge. But their rules significantly limit these rights, especially for women and girls, which is a form of harsh

¹⁹ Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Opening Statement by the State under Review, Universal Periodic Review, 46th Working Group Session, 29 April 2024*, UPR Meetings (OHCHR), accessed July 2025, https://uprmeetings.ohchr.org/Sessions/46/Afghanistan/DL_UPRDocuments/Afghanistan_State%20under%20review_opening%20statement.docx

²⁰ Samim, "International Legal Mechanisms to Safeguard Women's Rights: An Analysis of Afghan Women's Rights Under Taliban Rule," *Yale Journal of International Law*, January 26, 2025, <https://yjil.yale.edu/posts/2025-01-26-international-legal-mechanisms-to-safeguard-womens-rights-an-analysis-of-afghan>

²¹ Rachel Reid, *Manoeuvring Through the Cracks: The Afghan Human Rights Movement under the Islamic Emirate* (Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 19, 2025), PDF, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/06/20250619-Human-Rights-FINAL-corr.pdf>

discrimination based on gender. This puts an obstacle in the way of diplomacy and the law because the Taliban publicly call Western-influenced criticism "anti-Islamic" and say that things like public punishments are in line with their understanding of Islamic law. This rejection of international norms while still claiming governing authority shows a clear plan to keep Afghanistan out of global human rights frameworks and claim unique authority over how human rights are understood.

This report brings together information from top international and local human rights groups, such as UNAMA, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). It is very important that these formal reports are compared with qualitative data, such as student statements and lived experiences, to give a full picture that focuses on people and shows both the systematic character of infractions and how they affect people deeply.

Violation of the Right to Education

The Taliban has been systematically tearing down the school system, which has hurt women and girls the most. In March 2022, the de facto Ministry of Education stopped all girls' education after the sixth grade. This ban is still in place. In December 2022, the Ministry of Higher Education stopped women from going to university.²² In December 2024, women were officially forbidden from attending medical and semi-professional institutes, which made these limitations far more severe. This was one of the last remaining exceptions for women's education.²³ This ban

²² United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). *Report on the Implementation, Enforcement and Impact of the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Afghanistan*. Kabul: UNAMA, April 10, 2025. PDF.

https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_pvpv_report_10_april_2025_english.pdf

²³ UN Women. *Gender Index 2024: Afghanistan*. Executive summary. June 2025. PDF.
<https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/gender-index-2024-afghanistan-en.pdf>

is especially important because it makes the current healthcare crisis worse, as there aren't enough women healthcare workers in the country. Afghanistan is still the only country in the world where girls and women are not allowed to go to secondary school and onwards, even in 2025.

These bans have very clear and wide-ranging effects. There are still over 1.5 million young girls and women who are not in school as of 2025. The overall secondary school completion rate for women over 18 is expected to plummet to zero. This shows that there is a planned and long-term effort to keep women from learning and having future chances. This is a form of systematic dispossession that will create a future generation of women who are structurally disadvantaged, economically reliant, and mostly limited to domestic tasks. Not only does this strategy make poverty worse at the home level, it also makes it harder for the country and society to move forward. It is not only the right to education being violated, but it is also a planned, intergenerational move to make gender inequity permanent in all areas of society, producing a permanent underclass.²⁴

The World Bank estimates that barring women from going to school and working costs the economy more than \$1.4 billion a year. This shows how bad these policies are for the economy.²⁵ The UN Women Gender Index showed that in 2024, 77.6% of young Afghan women (ages 18 to 29) were not in school, working, or training (NEET). This is over four times greater than the

²⁴ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2025: Country Chapter on Afghanistan*, published online in 2025, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/afghanistan>

²⁵ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). *Report on the Implementation, Enforcement and Impact of the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Afghanistan*. Kabul: UNAMA, April 10, 2025. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_pvpv_report_10_april_2025_english.pdf.

percentage for men (20.2%).²⁶ This difference shows that the divide between men and women in education and jobs is growing quickly. People who have been affected by these prohibitions have given powerful accounts of how they have changed their lives. A former TV reporter who was forced to go back to Afghanistan in 2025 said without a doubt, "For women and girls... There are no jobs, no freedom of movement, and no education beyond grade six."²⁷ This feeling, which shows how completely educational options have been taken away, shows how deeply it affects people's lives and goals.

The mahram requirement that keeps female healthcare workers from going to work makes it harder for women to get the care they need, which is particularly distressing because women are more likely to be affected by the healthcare crisis. This shows that the Taliban cares more about their own beliefs and controlling the lives of women than about the well-being of the people or even basic healthcare.²⁸ They are not only violating women's rights by systematically removing them from the healthcare workforce and limiting their access to services, but they are also actively undermining the nation's public health infrastructure, which could have catastrophic repercussions on the entire population.

Gender Apartheid and Violence against Women

In the current Taliban regime, there is a widespread system of gender-based violence and discrimination that is making it almost impossible for women to participate in public life. The

²⁶ UN Women. *Gender Index 2024: Afghanistan*. New York: UN Women, June 2025. <https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/gender-index-2024-afghanistan-en.pdf>.

²⁷ United Nations, "OHCHR / Afghanistan Forced Returnees," UNifeed video, United Nations, accessed July 26, 2025.

²⁸ Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2025: Afghanistan*. January 16, 2025. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/afghanistan>

MPVPV regulations, which were officially announced in August 2024, made official more than 100 strict regulations that had been in place since August 2021.²⁹ These rules are meant to keep women out of public life by demanding that demand it to cover their faces completely, banning public speech, and significantly restricting their freedom of movement, expression, job possibilities, political and public participation, and access to healthcare. This formalization turns limitations that were once free or limited to certain areas into permanent laws, making the Taliban's oppressive dictatorship more intense by incorporating a part of the state's legal system. This makes it much harder to oppose or reverse in the future, providing a "legitimate" (from their point of view) reason for widespread human rights abuse. This makes the case for "gender apartheid" as a crime against humanity stronger.³⁰

Women are much less likely than men to work in 2024 (24% compared to 89%), which shows how bad economic marginalization is. Most of the women whose work is in informal, low-paying, and less secure jobs.³¹ Women were still not allowed to work in the public sector, with only a few exceptions (such as elementary education and healthcare). The restriction on women working with UN organizations and NGOs stayed the same. In May 2024, it was announced that women who were prohibited from state positions but were still on the payroll would have their wages lowered to a measly AFN 5,000 (USD 70) per month.³² In 2024, just 6.8% of women had a

²⁹ Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Opening Statement by the State under Review, 46th Session of the Universal Periodic Review, 29 April 2024*. Geneva: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

³⁰ Samim, Roqia. "International Legal Mechanisms to Safeguard Women's Rights: An Analysis of Afghan Women's Rights Under Taliban Rule." *Yale Journal of International Law*, January 26, 2025.

³¹ UN Women Australia, "Nearly Eight Out of Ten Young Afghan Women Are Excluded from Education, Jobs and Training." *The United Nations Correspondent*, June 17, 2025. <https://theunitednationscorrespondent.com/nearly-eight-out-of-ten-young-afghan-women-are-excluded-from-education-jobs-and-training/>.

³² Ibid.

personal or joint bank account or used mobile money services, compared to 20.1% of males. This makes it very hard for them to be financially independent and strong. This shows a bigger plan to take away people's economic power. The Taliban makes women dependent on the economy by systematically keeping them out of the formal economy and severely limiting their financial independence.³³ These forces women into domestic roles, make them more vulnerable, and make it much harder for them to resist or fight for their rights. Women can't play sports, go to parks, use public baths, or work.

Mahrams (male guardians) make it very hard for women to move about freely, making it hard for them to travel for job or medical care. Drivers can't take women who aren't accompanying them, and women can't use public transportation without a mahram, which makes it even harder to get to important services like healthcare.³⁴ The UN Women Gender Index 2024 shows how bad this exclusion is, giving Afghanistan a score of 0.173 on the Women's Empowerment Index (WEI) and 0.237 on the Global Gender Parity Index (GGPI). This means that Afghan women only accomplish 17.3% of their full potential and achieve 23.7% of what men do in important areas of human life, which is a shocking 76.3% gender difference.³⁵ Afghanistan comes in second to last in the world on these measures. In terms of politics, there are no women in the de facto Cabinet or local offices, which means that women are not represented in politics.³⁶

³³ Amnesty International, "Afghanistan," *Amnesty International Report 2024/25: The State of the World's Human Rights* (London: Amnesty International, 2025), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/>.

³⁴ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), *Report on the Implementation, Enforcement and Impact of the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Afghanistan* (Kabul: UNAMA, April 10, 2025), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_pvpv_report_10_april_2025_english.pdf.

³⁵ UN Women. *Gender Index 2024: Afghanistan*. June 17, 2025. New York: UN Women.

³⁶ Ibid.

International organizations are starting to see this kind of prejudice as possibly being gender persecution or gender apartheid. The UN Special Rapporteur on the state of human rights in Afghanistan and the Working Group on Discrimination Against Women and Girls say that the Taliban may be committing gender persecution and gender apartheid by ruling through systematic discrimination with the objective to completely control women and girls. Richard Bennett, the UN Special Rapporteur, called it "an institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity, and exclusion of women and girls."³⁷ The 2024 report from Amnesty International clearly says that women and girls were victims of the "crime against humanity of gender persecution." The "Har Taraf Maruf" study from Womankind Worldwide, which was officially released in March 2025 and again in June 2025, says that the MPVPV law sets up a system of gender apartheid, increases the number of morality police, and makes communities feel more isolated and untrustworthy.³⁸

The saying "I can't live with the Taliban because of my sister's education" summarizes how deeply the Taliban's policies affect people and families. The "constant, suffocating fear" that Afghan women talked about in the Womankind Worldwide report shows how the systemic exclusion from education, job, and public life makes life unpleasant. The different ways that women are restricted from education, work, movement, public appearance, and speech, are not separate events, but

³⁷ Richard Bennett, *Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan* (Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Council, February 20, 2025), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4081103>.

³⁸ Amnesty International. "Afghanistan." In *Amnesty International Report 2024/25: Country Chapter on Afghanistan*. Accessed July 26, 2025. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/>.

rather a "tightly interconnected patchwork."³⁹ The "culture of uncertainty and fear" is a direct outcome of the widely used enforcement, which is now being done not just by the government but also by "local community and family members." The fact that males can be penalized for women not following the rules shows that the Taliban's control methods have become a part of society, causing people to regulate themselves and trust one other less.⁴⁰

More and more people are seeing the systemic marginalization of women and girls and the widespread discrimination and violence against them as gender persecution, which is a crime against humanity. The brutality of this persecution is shown by the fact that public stoning and whipping to death for accused adultery were made legal again in 2024.⁴¹ In May 2025, public punishments went up a lot, with more over 100 people being whipped, most of them women. Afghan Witness reports that there were 840 occurrences of gender-based violence between January 2022 and June 2024, including 332 deaths.⁴² This is based on open-source monitoring. Reports also say that women who are in jail have been sexually abused, attacked, treated badly, tortured, and even raped. In a big step forward, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor asked for arrest warrants for two Taliban officials in January 2025 for gender-based persecution. This was the Court's first case of this kind. In July 2025, two further warrants were issued. In addition, in September 2024, Australia, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands took Afghanistan

³⁹ Womankind Worldwide. "Har Taraf Marūf: Where Virtue Means Control – Women's Stories from Inside Afghanistan." Blog post, June 10, 2025. Accessed July 26, 2025. <https://www.womankind.org.uk/har-taraf-maruf-where-virtue-means-control-womens-stories-from-inside-afghanistan/>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. "Afghanistan." Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Accessed July 26, 2025. <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/afghanistan/>

⁴² Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. "Afghanistan." Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Accessed July 26, 2025. <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/afghanistan/>

to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for breaking CEDAW.⁴³ This shows that more and more people around the world are recognizing how serious and widespread these abuses are.

Persecution of Minorities and Former Officials

During Taliban rule, religious and ethnic minorities, particularly the Shia-Hazara people, were often attacked and assassinated, mostly by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province. This included "widespread and systematic targeted attacks by ISKP and the Taliban against ethnic and religious minorities". Aside from the ongoing cruelty, the Taliban banned religious practice and study. Shia jurisprudence was still strictly forbidden in the school system.⁴⁴ There were also disturbing stories of the Taliban forcibly converting Shia Muslims to Sunni Islam, implying a larger goal of religious uniformity. There were also ongoing Ashura celebrational limitations, which were primarily observed by Shia populations. This shows a coordinated effort to achieve religious and ethnic uniformity, in which perceived ideological obstacles are eliminated and power is concentrated through the implementation of a single, extremist brand of Islam. This extends beyond human rights violations to cultural and religious persecution, and if left unchecked, could lead to atrocity crimes, as Hazara activists fear genocide.⁴⁵

For former government and security officials, the situation is tense. Despite the Taliban's public promise of a "general amnesty" in August 2021, ground reality contradicts this

⁴³ Reid, Rachel. *Manoeuvring Through the Cracks: The Afghan Human Rights Movement under the Islamic Emirate*. Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 19, 2025.

⁴⁴ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. "Afghanistan." Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Accessed July 26, 2025. <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/afghanistan/>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

commitment.⁴⁶ Between the first and second quarters of 2024, UNAMA documented 98 and 20 cases of arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, as well as torture and ill-treatment, primarily targeting former government and security officials.⁴⁷ During these months, nine former government security personnel were assassinated. This abrupt mismatch between stated amnesty and claimed targeted attacks suggests planned revenge. and misleading techniques. The "amnesty" is staged, possibly to encourage re-flight or to satisfy global sentiment, but the truth is systematic persecution. This shows that people don't trust the Taliban's promises, and it means that returns, especially those who used to be members, will have to take huge and planned risks that go against all sense of return and security and all signs of reintegration.

Restrictions on Free Expression, Assembly, and Breakdown of Justice and Legal Protections

The Taliban's rule has systematically dismantled both freedom of expression and the established legal framework, replacing them with a system designed for absolute control. Freedom of expression is relentlessly suppressed, with Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranking Afghanistan among the three worst countries for media freedom in 2024. The first half of 2025 saw a significant escalation, with the Afghanistan Journalists Center (AFJC) documenting at least 140 incidents of media freedom violations, a 56% increase from H1 2024.⁴⁸ This included the

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of State. *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2024. Accessed July 26, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/afghanistan/>.

⁴⁷ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). *Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: April–June 2024 Update*. Kabul: UNAMA, July 30, 2024. UNAMA Human Rights Service. <https://unama.unmissions.org/human-rights-situation-afghanistan-april-june-2024-update-English>.

⁴⁸ Afghanistan Journalists Centre (AFJC). "Annual Report on Media Freedom in Afghanistan for 1403 Solar Year: Troubling Increase in Violations." IFEX, March 16, 2025. Accessed July 26, 2025. <https://ifex.org/afghanistan-troubling-intensification-in-the-repression-of-media-freedoms/>.

forced closure of at least 26 media outlets (23 local TV stations) and the detention of at least 20 journalists, mostly accused of "propaganda through collaboration with external media". As of July 2025, six journalists remained incarcerated.⁴⁹ Bans on political and economic reporting and women's voices in local media (March 2025, Kandahar) are broadly adopted. Between August 2021 and September 2024, UNAMA reported 336 instances of arbitrary arrest, torture, and intimidation against journalists.⁵⁰ Freedom of peaceful assembly is severely curtailed. Initial women's protests faced violence, leading to a ban on unsanctioned demonstrations. Consequently, 94% of women's protests now occur indoors. This pervasive fear and self-censorship are evident in student responses, where political questions often elicit "Not sure" or "No idea".⁵¹

The justice system has been systematically dismantled. All former government judges, including 270 women, have been dismissed and replaced by Taliban-affiliated judges lacking professional legal training. The Attorney General's Office is abolished, and women are prohibited from registering as lawyers, eliminating official female legal representation.⁵² Access to justice was "virtually non-existent" as of August 2024. UN Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett stated in June 2025 that the Taliban is "instrumentalizing the legal and justice sectors" to establish gender oppression. Public punishments are consistently conducted. Edicts implemented in 2024 reinstated public stoning and beating to death for alleged adultery. Public floggings surged in May 2025,

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ UNAMA, *Human Rights in Afghanistan: 1 January–30 September 2024* (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, October 2024), 21–23,

⁵¹ Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2025: Country Chapter on Afghanistan*. New York: Human Rights Watch published online January 16, 2025. July 26, 2025.

⁵² Yap, James. "UN Expert Report: Taliban Dismantle Afghanistan Justice System." JURIST, June 2025. Accessed July 26, 2025. <https://www.jurist.org/news/2025/06/un-expert-report-taliban-dismantles-afghani-justice-system/>.

affecting over one hundred people, many women.⁵³ In 2024, at least 147 men, twenty-eight women, and four boys were publicly punished. The Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) has broad discretionary powers, including detaining individuals for up to three days. UNAMA documented 1,033 instances of unlawful force by MPVPV members (Aug 2021-Mar 2024), affecting 205 women/girls and 828 men/boys.⁵⁴ Over half of the PVPV law-related arbitrary detentions concerned men's appearance. This dual suppression of expression and legal protections creates a climate of pervasive control, where fear and arbitrary enforcement replace due process and fundamental freedoms.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the lived experiences of Afghan students and civilians under Taliban governance since August 2021, evaluating their current situation through the framework of governmentality. Applying Foucault's theoretical framework, the study discusses how education, gender, surveillance, and human rights are used as tools of ideological domination, oppression, and social engineering. The Taliban administration has not only controlled but changed the social fabric through a comprehensive biopolitical and disciplinary structure designed to cultivate loyal and docile citizens. The results obtained from qualitative student surveys and human rights reports highlight the complex aspects of oppression in Afghanistan post-2021. Education has been utilized as a tool of oppression, particularly against women, depriving half the population of their rights, autonomy, and opportunities. Gender-based legislation have

⁵³ Yap, *UN Expert Report: Taliban Dismantle Afghanistan Justice System*.

⁵⁴ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), *Media Freedom in Afghanistan: Violations Against Journalists and Media Workers, 15 August 2021–30 September 2024* (Kabul: UNAMA Human Rights Service, October 2024), accessed July 26, 2025, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_report_on_media_freedom_in_afghanistan.pdf.

systematically excluded women from public participation, establishing a patriarchal societal framework that criminalizes female autonomy. The resurgence of moral rules and regulations, surveillance mechanisms, and the reign of terror worsens this control, creating an environment where criticism is suppressed and internalized. Despite these oppressive conditions, the chapter also reveals vital undercurrents of resistance and hope. Students' statements, whether expressing resistance, imagining alternative futures, or advocating for policy reforms, indicate the ongoing presence of counter-conduct even under authoritarian regimes. These voices contest the regime's attempts to create submissive individuals, demonstrating that authority, regardless of its extent, is never perfect. The chapter also records severe and systemic human rights incidents, including gender apartheid, curtailments of freedom of expression, and the weakening of judicial protections. These actions not only violate Afghanistan's obligations under international treaties such as CEDAW and ICCPR but also amount to crimes against humanity as acknowledged by international legal authorities. The Taliban's activities signify not merely the suppression of rights but a systematic and intentional elimination of legal, cultural, and democratic structures.


In summary, the Taliban's governance shows a repressive and profoundly established form of governmentality that merges ideological supremacy with institutional disintegration. Despite persecution, the determination to resist persists, especially among the youth, who are poised to be catalysts for future change. The conflict of control and resistance highlights the persistent struggle for dignity, rights, and independence in modern Afghanistan.

Appendix A

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE.


What is your gender?

76 responses




Which best describes your current education level?

76 responses




Which best describes where you live?

76 responses




I feel I understand who holds leadership positions in the current Taliban government.

76 responses




Which of the following groups have significant power or influence in the current government?
(Select all that apply.)

76 responses




Please share any additional thoughts on the Taliban's governance or leadership structure.

25 responses




I feel the rights of women and girls have been significantly curtailed under the current government.

76 responses



In general, all ethnic and religious groups are treated equally by the current government.

76 responses



Please describe any changes you have observed in civil or human rights

(especially for women and minorities) since 2021. 23 responses

No idea

No

Education

Justice is being servings according to the Taliban interpretation

Ban on women education should be lifted

I don't know

Nothing the women not allowed to go anywhere

Women education

From Strickness into little flexibility,

I don't have information

No education for women and they cannot get into politics

no change

ها اقلیت و زنان حقوق سلب و کامل دگرگونی

One of best point They equally deal the right way with all community and minorities.

There's no changes in Taliban devil is devil

All they saying that they are applying islamic laws which is some how right .

Don't know

Nothing

Not sure

Education, education and education


Women is the half of population in the country, they deserve to be treated well, they have the right of education, there is no Ayyat or Hadith to banned education for women's in Islam. I strongly believe that in Afghanistan there will be no any educational system for women's to study under Taliban's government.

Some of the right are okay but school are not okay they close the schools

Don't have any idea.


I have sufficient opportunities to continue my education (school or university) under the current government.

76 responses




I feel I have reliable access to news and information (e.g., internet, media) under the current government.

76 responses




Please describe any barriers you face in accessing education or information.

22 responses




I feel comfortable expressing my opinions openly (for example, on social media or in class) under the current government.

76 responses




Media (TV, radio, newspapers, internet) operate without heavy censorship under the current government.

76 responses




Please share any experiences or observations of media censorship or restrictions on speech.

19 responses




I feel that my community has become more peaceful and stable under the current government.

76 responses




I feel that people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds are treated equally in my community under the current government.

76 responses




Please share any observations about changes in social stability or ethnic relations in your community.

13 responses




I feel personally safe in my daily life (for example, at home, in school, or when traveling locally) under the current government.

76 responses



People in my community support and help each other during difficult times under the current government.

76 responses



Please share any personal safety concerns you have.

17 responses

No idea

Female are facing multiple challenges in the current Taliban rule. People from the previous government are also facing problem in this regime for example judges of pervious government and other officials.

None

I don't have

NILL

Education and good behavior

Everything is okay until I dont speak against them

no any personal safety

1, focus to public need and fulfill it. 2, compromise to former government leader and deal with them somehow bring them back to country otherwise they will be use like tool for war against current government. 3, Open the door of education for girls, we need participation of them at medical field IT field

No nothing thanks

Is democrats i can't live with Taliban bcz I'm thinking about my sister's education my brothers r jobless bcz they were members of previously government so I'm not happy in this government

Not know

No concern

No thanks

Now I'm out of country

high school

Sometimes I am curious about when this government ends and I can continue my school or college.

